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Transport infrastructure is important for economic 
growth. In Nepal, about 20 percent of rural residents 
have to spend more than 3 hours to go to the nearest 
marketplace or agriculture center. Public procurement 
is an important policy instrument to use resources 
wisely and efficiently. This paper analyzes a series of 
policy questions, from procurement design to contract 
management and project quality assurance. The paper 
finds that the competition effect is significant. To enhance 
This paper is a product of the  Sustainable Development Department, South Asia Region. It is part of a larger effort by 
the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around 
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competition, bidding documents can be distributed free 
of charge on a website. The bid preparation period can be 
extended. Security issues are also found to be particularly 
important to avoid unnecessary cost overruns and project 
delays. Heavy rainfall and the bidders’ low-balling 
strategy are identified as other factors of project delays. 
The quality of roads would deteriorate with not only 
security incidence but also time, precipitation and traffic 
volume.  
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
 
Transport infrastructure is among the most important driving forces for economic growth. In 
Nepal, rural road accessibility remains a crucial challenge. The vast majority of rural 
residents had to spend more than 30 minutes to access to paved roads. Public procurement is 
an important policy instrument to use resources wisely and efficiently.  
 
This paper addresses a series of policy challenges in public road procurement, from 
procurement planning to contract management and project quality assurance. Important, 
these issues are interrelated to each other. Therefore, the issues need to be addressed in 
concert. Using data collected from 155 rural road upgrading contracts in Nepal, five 
questions are addressed: How do bidders determine their bidding strategy, i.e., bid prices, in 
competitive bidding for rural road contracts? How do they decide whether to participate in 
the procurement market? What are the main determinants of efficiency in contracting road 
works? Why ex post contract amendments, such as cost overruns and delays, happen? Which 
factor is important to ensure the quality of roads delivered by the project?  
 
Our main findings and policy implications are as follows:  
 
1.  Competition needs to be enhanced particularly in government owned projects.   
 
Competition is the most important factor to bring down road procurement costs. The level of 
competition is clearly insufficient in some public tenders in Nepal. In particular in 
government owned projects, the average competition is about 4.5, unfavorably compared to 
an average of 7.3 in World Bank financed projects. Significant losses―possibly, $3 
million―are estimated to be incurred by the lack of competition.  
 
2.  Wider distribution of tender information at cheaper costs increases competition as well 
as transparency and accountability.  
 
To attract more interest and bidders, tender notices should be distributed widely and at low 
costs. This will bring down the cost of entry for firms. Public tenders can be advertized on 
national newspapers, rather than local ones. E-bidding or e-procurement can distribute tender 
information even more widely and in a timely manner. The findings are consistent with the 
recent initiative that the Nepal government has taken in its e-procurement strategy. 
 
3.  Longer bid preparation periods encourage bidder participation in public tenders.  
 
As stipulated in the procurement guidelines, it is important to grant sufficient time for firms 
to prepare bids. By doing so, even inexperienced contractors are allowed to consider to 
participate in auctions, thereby intensifying competition in the market. Of particular note, the 
extension of the bid preparation period is a no-cost measure for procurers. In Nepal, some of 
the government owned projects had extremely short bid preparation periods. As an indicative  
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target, 30 days may have to be given for bid preparation. The cost savings could be $0.2 
million in the total sample projects financed by DDCs.  
 
4.  Procurement packaging is an important element to influence the firms’ entry and 
bidding decisions  
 
The study shows that the competition increases with the size of contracts. Too small 
contracts are not profitable enough to encourage potential contractors to participate in 
competitive bidding. Particularly, the number of participants can be increased to about 7 
bidders for small contracts with a length of 10 km or less, which are the majority of the rural 
road contracts in Nepal. Procurers should reexamine the way of contract packaging to take 
advantage of the competition effect. 
 
5.  Local contractors’ capabilities need to be fostered to enhance competition.  
 
Firm location does not matter to bid prices but influences the bidders’ entry strategy. For 
projects far from the capital where many construction firms are located, a fewer firms would 
likely apply. In addition, local firms do not appear competitive enough, despite their potential 
advantages of proximity to the project location. Public procurement can be used to foster the 
local business capacities. However, the careful allocation of projects is necessary to maintain 
competitive pressure and transparency in the market.  
 
6.  Security is great concern for not only procurement costs but also road management.  
 
Security issues would push up bid prices and discourage the market entry of potential firms. 
Both will end up with a heavy burden on the economy. In addition, security incidence would 
cause cost overruns and project delays. Unstable security would also hamper timely road 
maintenance required. As a result, the quality of roads would deteriorate quickly where 
security is not secured.  
 
7.  Severe weather causes project delays.  
 
The government should be aware of the risk of project delays caused by weather conditions. 
It rains a lot in Nepal. Increased precipitation is likely to cause project delays, which often 
lead to cost overruns and fiscal inefficiency. Some flexibility may be needed in the road 
procurement planning and budget formulation in Nepal.  
 
8.  Proper and solid project design and preparation help to avoid unnecessary contract 
amendments and improve efficiency in the whole project cycle.  
 
Proper project specifications are important to avoid unnecessary contract amendments and 
minimize the risk of contractors’ opportunistic behavior. In particular, large projects must be 
prepared carefully. Cost overruns and project delays tend to occur in relatively large road  
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works. To ensure the quality of works, quality assurance mechanisms, such as post-
qualification review, need to be established in the procurement system.  
 
9.  Roads are deteriorating with time, traffic and precipitation, if not properly maintained. 
 
The quality of roads would decline with the duration of use of roads, traffic volume and 
cumulative precipitation. In Nepal, the vast majority of roads would be rated to be ―very 
uncomfortable‖ if they are used for more than one year without proper maintenance.  
 
10. Capacity building for efficient road procurement is necessary at local level  
 
Government effectiveness in making road contracts varies significantly across districts. The 
difference can be attributed partly to technical reasons, such as technical complexity of 
projects. But it is also because the government capacities may not be sufficient at the local 
level. Important, the lengthy contract award process is likely to result in significant project 
delays. Thus, it is critical to develop the procurement capability of local governments. In 
addition, efforts toward procurement efficiency may be needed in collaboration with donors. 
While about 30 days are required to award a road contract in DDC projects, it takes more 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
 
Transport infrastructure is among the most important driving forces for economic growth. 
Sustained access to infrastructure is essential to improve living standards. In particular in 
rural areas, the lack of access to reliable transport infrastructure remains a significant 
constraint for people’s daily life and local businesses in developing countries. About 900 
million rural dwellers are estimated to have no access to all-weather road within two 
kilometers over the world.  
 
In Nepal, rural road accessibility is one of the most crucial challenges. The vast majority of 
rural residents had to spend more than 30 minutes to access to paved roads. About one-third 
do not have paved road within more than 3 hours. The lack of access to all-season roads 
significantly limits their economic opportunities in remote areas. About 20 percent of rural 
residents have to spend more than 3 hours to go to the nearest marketplace or agriculture 
center. The road deficiency also has adverse effects on social welfare. Most urban people 
may find a health post within less than 30 minutes. However, for rural people, it often takes 
more than 1 hour (Nepal CBS, 2004).  
 
In Nepal, road density remains low particularly in mountainous areas. On a per capita basis, 
road density is also low in northern and northeastern districts (Figure 1). In these regions, 
many rural roads were in operational condition only during the dry season. Road density 
looks relatively high around the capital, Kathmandu. However, with the significant 
concentration of population on the capital area taken into account, there may not be sufficient 
road network even in the capital area. In Terai, the road density per population is relatively 
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Figure 1. Road density in Nepal  
 
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Nepal (2004). 
 
Recognizing the issues in the transport sector, the government has been making efforts to 
improve the rural accessibility by upgrading dry-season-only roads to all-season standards 
and providing structures, gravel surface and Otta seal, which is a low-cost paving option 
(World Bank, 2005; 2007). Some of the impacts have already been observed. An interim 
survey of the project indicates that the people’s mobility increased by more than 20 percent 
and that their travel time declined dramatically from 2.6 hours to 32 minutes on average 
(World Bank, 2009).  
 
However, resources available for infrastructure development continue to be limited, as in 
other developing countries.
1 Nepal spent $105 million or 1.2 percent of GDP for road 
development (World Bank, 2005). This is more or less equally comparable with regional 
countries, such as Bangladesh spending 0.7 percent of GDP on transport infrastructure and 
India 1.4 percent. But these may still be far below the infrastructure needs, which are 
estimated at 3-7 percent of GDP in typical low-income countries.  
 
Public procurement is an important instrument to use resources wisely and efficiently (e.g., 
Iimi, 2006; Estache and Iimi, 2011). ―[T]he best way to find fiscal space for public 
investment is to eliminate waste and improve technical efficiency in public expenditure 
(World Bank, 2005).‖ However, how to design an efficient procurement system is still a 
challenging task, especially in the infrastructure sector. Infrastructure projects are often 
technically complex, highly customized and politically sensitive. As a result, competition for 
public contracts tends to be limited, and the procurement markets would likely be vulnerable 
                                                 
1 See more discussion on transport infrastructure financing in Annex I.  
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to collusive bidding and corruption. The lengthy bid evaluation process is of particular 
concern. It will reduce transparency of the process and increase the risk of anticompetitive 
practices and cost overruns (Ware et al., 2007).  
 
The current paper primarily aims at examining the firms’ bidding and entry strategy to 
establish an efficient public road procurement system. However, it also casts light on a series 
of policy issues related to contract management and project quality assurance, because public 
contracts for infrastructure projects are often far from complete. In addition, firms can take 
the low-balling strategy—which is to submit an unrealistic bid and initiate renegotiation 
afterward (Ware and others, 2007). If this strategy cannot be excluded, the procurement 
performance needs to be analyzed along with assessment of ex post contract amendments as 
well as the quality of projects delivered.  
 
The paper collected new data on procurement and contract performance from 155 rural road 
upgrading works in Nepal, on which about 820 bids were submitted. The quality of roads 
was also assessed by road specialists who visited every road location. The remaining paper is 
organized as follows: Section II describes recent road developments and other relevant issues 
in Nepal. Section III develops the empirical models with all possible hypotheses taken into 
account. The section also presents our data in an informal way. Section IV summarizes our 




II. RECENT ROAD DEVELOPMENTS AND RELEVANT ISSUES IN NEPAL  
 
Nepal is one of the least developed countries in the world. About 29 million people live in 
the country, out of which half still live on less than $1.25 a day at 2005 international prices. 
Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita was about $430 in 2009. In the country, there 
exists some 17,000 km of road network. This is about 12 km per 100 sq. km of land area, 
which is compared unfavorably to other developing countries in the region. Not only quantity  
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but also quality of roads has been low. About 40 percent of roads in Nepal remain to be 
paved (Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2. Road density in South Asia 
 
Note: Figures are the latest available data in 2002-2007.  
Source: World Development Indicators.  
 
In Nepal there are several important rural road reconstruction and rehabilitation projects 
assisted by multi- and bi-lateral donors. While the World Bank has been assisting the Rural 
Access Improvement and Decentralization Project (RAIDP) in 20 districts mainly in the 
Terai area, other donors, such as Asian Development Bank and UK Department for 
International Development (DfID), have been supporting other 45 districts under the Rural 
Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Sector Development Project. The remaining 10 districts 
are planned to be covered by scaling up the RAIDP.  
 
In the RAIDP, the 20 districts were selected according to the predetermined performance 
evaluation framework composed of a wide range of criteria, such as project preparedness, 
existing infrastructure gap and poverty profile. The framework aimed at creating institutional 
incentives to compete for resources among districts. The funding allocation was also 
designed on a performance basis. However, the original performance criteria were found 
unsuitable, given the prevailing conflict unstable political conditions, and low 
implementation capabilities at the district level. Therefore, the criteria were somewhat 
simplified, focusing on financial and physical progress of the works carried out.  
 
Three entities share responsibility for the rural road development and maintenance in Nepal: 
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Agricultural Roads (DOLIDAR), and individual District Development Committees (DDCs). 
DDCs are the main implementing agencies to prepare District Transport Management Plans, 
prioritize the local needs, mobilize community groups, and procure and manage civil works 
and services. However, the DDCs planning and implementation capacity remains weak. Thus, 
DOLIDAR is playing an important role in coordinating DDCs and providing technical and 
engineering support to them. MOLD is responsible for general oversight and monitoring of 
the whole program.  
 
We collected procurement and contract data from 155 rural road upgrading works in 19 Terai 
districts assisted by the World Bank.
2 Data were also collected from projects financed by the 
government and other aid agencies. In each district, about 8 road contracts were 
reviewed―half from World Bank-financed projects and half from government-owned 
projects (Figure 3). Because of the selection criteria of the RAIDP, these districts have the 
relatively high road-sector development performance and thus high road density (Figure 4).   
 














                                                 
2 One of the 20 districts assisted by the RAIDP has not yet had road work contracts that can be evaluated at the 
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Figure 4. Existing road network and districts covered by our sample  
 
 
Security is a matter of particular concern in Nepal. In particular in the Terai area where our 
data were collected, more security incidents were reported (Figure 5). According to the UN 
Nepal Security Database, about 200 security related incidents, such as abduction, attack and 
murder, happen nationwide every month (Figure 6). For public road procurement, 
intimidation or other threats could deter bidder participation. Local news has been reporting 
violence and intimidation against contractors placing bids. In our sample data, a project 
district is estimated to have experienced 3 incidents every month during the project 
implementation period. By construction, any measures to avoid conflicts and defend 
themselves would add to project costs and result in project delays.  
 
The country has been making efforts to improve the justice and security systems to promote 
rule of law and inclusive and equitable growth (United Nations, 2011). The government 
enacted the Procurement Act and Right To Information Act to improve procurement 
environment by legislation. However, it seems that there is still a long way to establish a 








Districts covered by our sample
Nepal DISTRICTS 
 
- 11 - 
 
Figure 5. Number of security-related incidents by district  
 
Source: UN Nepal Security Database.  
 
 
Figure 6. Number of security-related incidents in Nepal  
 
Source: UN Nepal Security Database.  
 
 
In general, governance matters to public procurement. In Nigeria, the majority of private 
firms surveyed on perceptions of public sector procurement reforms answered that they 
decided not to submit their expressions of interest in recent public tenders, because they did 
not trust the selection process. There is a general perception that contractors are 
predetermined or must pay a bribe. Particularly, integrity tends to be relatively weaker at the 
subnational levels (World Bank, 2008c).  
 
In Nepal, ethnicity may be another issue that might affect the bidders’ entry strategy in the 
market. In Nepal there are 103 castes and ethnic groups.
3 In some areas, a dominant ethnic 
group accounts for nearly half the population in a district. There is a general perception that 
                                                 
3 In the 1991 census, there were 60 castes and ethnic groups in the country, some of which are re-categorized 
into new groups in the 2001 census.  
.
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ethnicity might be a barrier to entry in the public procurement market. In our sample, about 
40 percent of bidders come from the districts where the dominant ethnic group is the same. 
The ethnicity barriers look high in certain districts (Figure 7).
4  
 
Figure 7. Share of bidders that come from districts  
with the same dominant ethnicity as project areas (percent)  
 
 
Weather may be another important determinant of road procurement and contract 
performance in Napal. Some of the selected districts have much precipitation, particularly in 
summer (Figure 8). In our sample districts, the average monthly precipitation over the past 10 
years was about 200 mm per a month. The average monthly precipitation was relatively low 
in Banke and Kaski. But the precipitation exceeded 300 mm per month in Banke and 
Nuwakot (Figure 9). 
5  
 
Precipitation has two implications in our context. First, heavy rains and storms will interrupt 
civil works, causing project delays and cost overruns. Second, precipitation can have an 
implication to the quality of roads. Particularly, unpaved or gravel roads are vulnerable to 





                                                 
4 For instance, 47 percent of district population in Makwanpur is Tamang people. 30 out of 49 bidders who 
applied for road projects in the district were local―registered in Makwanpur―or come from other districts 
where the dominant ethnic group is also Tamang, such as Dhading and Nuwakot.   
5 Our monthly precipitation data are based on 20 weather stations that are close to our surveyed roads. Thus, the 
precipitation variables that we use in this paper are district-specific but time-variant and thus contract-specific.  
38
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Figure 8. Average monthly precipitation for the past 10 years  
 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on data from the Ministry of Environment, Nepal.  
 
 




Given these backgrounds, road procurement costs vary significantly across districts, though 
the absolute levels remain low by global standards. The average unit cost of road upgrading 
is about NRs1.6 million or $23,000 per km (Table 1), which is far below the range of unit 
costs supported by the literature.
6 This is mainly because of the project specifications. Our 
sampled roads are mostly unpaved, gravel roads with simple surface treatment, if any. If an 
additional surface material, such as otta seals, is added, the project cost increases by $3,000-
4,000 per km. Still, it is relatively cheap.  
 
Normalized bids, which are bid prices relative to engineering cost estimates, vary from 0.55 
in Dhanusa to 1.05 in Syangja (Figure 10). Normalized bids are a good indicator to 
incorporate unobserved heterogeneity in road specifications. The average normalized bid is 
                                                 
6 An estimate of unit cost is about $410,000 per km (Fay and Yepes, 2003). Another is $390,000 for 
rehabilitation and $360,000 for upgrading in Africa (Alexeeva, Padam and Queiroz, 2008). Foster and Briceno-
Garmendia (2010) also estimate the road rehabilitation cost at $200,000 to $500,000 per km, depending on 
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about 0.8, which means that the government’s engineering cost estimates are reasonable but 
tend to slightly overestimate the true costs. The question is why some districts are spending 
twice as high normalized costs as others. This paper will explore reasons.  
 
Table 1. Average rural road contract and unit costs in Nepal 
   Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Actual payment per contract (million rupee)  156  7.76  7.95  0.14  39.89 
Actual payment per km (million rupee)  156  1.63  2.32  0.02  21.97 
 




Lack of competition may be one of the alleged concerns. The average number of bidders that 
participated in competitive bidding is about 6. This appears consistent with the existing 
literature. For highway construction auctions in Florida, the number of bidders ranged from 2 
to 19, with an average of about 5 (Gupta, 2002). In Oklahoma, the average number of bidders 
is 3.3 (De Silva, Dunne, and Kosmopoulou, 2003). In Africa, road auctions have an average 
of 5 firms with a range of between 1 and 15. Most have 3 or 4 bidders (Alexeeva, Padam, and 
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In Nepal the level of competition varies considerably across regions. The average number of 
bidders was only about 3 in Kailali and Rautahat. But competitive bidding in Dhanusa 
attracted more than 9 firms on average (Figure 11). There is some broad consistency between 
the level of competition and realized procurement costs. Where competition is limited, 
normalized bids tend to be high.  
 
Figure 11. Average number of bidders by district 
 
 
Potential entrants do exist in the country, but they may be located unevenly across regions. If 
firms that bought the bidding documents but decided not to submit bids are considered as 
potential contractors, there are a number of prospective bidders particularly in the north of 
Kathmandu and Western districts, such as Kailali and Bardiya. In these districts, only 2-3 out 
of 10 potential contractors that bought the bidding documents submitted bids (Figure 12).  
 
Figure 12. Participation rate of potential contractors  
 
 
There are many possible reasons why these prospective firms did not enter the market. On 
the physical side, firm location may matter (e.g., Porter and Zona, 1993; Price, 2008). There 
are two potential implications. First, the entry costs may be high for firms located far from a 
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project site. They may not be familiar with local conditions around the site. They may not be 
acquainted with potential contenders in the local market. Therefore, they may have to incur 
more costs to prepare their bids. This can result in limiting the bidder participation.  
 
Second, the cost of undertaking a project may also be high for those who are located far from 
the project site. They may not have transaction with good local material suppliers. 
Supervising the work from a distant place is generally more costly, because of higher 
transportation and travel costs. It is usually costly to transport road work equipment, such as 
paver, across regions, especially in the mountainous areas. In addition, skill and equipment 
sets required may be different across regions; thus, applying for contracts in distant places 
may add to production costs. This will be reflected in bid prices. Otherwise, firms may 
simply decide not to enter the market.  
 
In our data, a large number of bidders come from the nation’s capital, Kathmandu, and its 
neighboring districts in the south (Figure 13). Fewer contractors may be willing to undertake 
road works in distant places from Kathmandu. In such cases, contract prices may be high, 
because of high transaction and mobilization costs of firms.  
 
Figure 13. Number of bidders by origin district  
 
 
Procurement planning is also an important element influencing the firms’ entry and bidding 
decisions. In Nepal, most contracts assisted by the World Bank and other donors are fairly 
small. How to (un)bundle project components is an important policy question to encourage or 
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smaller contracts may attract more contractors that are relatively small yet specialized. On 
the other hand, dividing a project into smaller contracts will sacrifice potential economies of 
scale in procurement and production.  
 
There exists a rule of thumb for how to divide tasks, but significant flexibility in procurement 
planning is left to procurers.
7 Our sample data show the mixed relationship between the size 
of contracts and the number of bidders. For relatively small contracts, participants increased 
in number with the size of contracts (Figure 14). This may be because small contracts are too 
costly for firms to undertake, given their high transaction and mobilization costs for small 
contracts. In addition, economies of scale exist in procurement (Figure 15).
8 As a result, the 
unit costs of road procurement tend to be high for small contracts, as shown in the case of 
Africa (e.g., Foster and Briceno-Garmendia, 2010).
9 But the number of participants may 
decline when the length of contracted roads increases further. Thus, more formal analysis is 
needed to investigate this tradeoff between the competition effect and economies of scale in 
procurement.  
 






                                                 
7 The World Bank’s current procurement guidelines stipulate that ―[t]he size and scope of individual contracts 
will depend on the magnitude, nature, and location of the project. For projects requiring a variety of goods and 
works, separate contracts generally are awarded for the supply and/or installation of different items of 
equipment and plant.‖  
8 Some of the statistical outliers are omitted, such as 2 observations with unit bid prices greater than NRs7.9 
million.  
9 A construction work of a more than 50 km road would cost $290,000 per km, but it would be $400,000 if it is 
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Figure 15. Contract size and winning bid per km  
 
 
Efficiency in road contracting in Nepal may be favorably compared to other low-income 
countries, especially in Africa, where the average time required to award a contract after the 
bid opening ranges from 2-3 months to nearly a year (Table 2). In Nepal, the bid evaluation 
takes on average about 65 days. But it varies across districts, ranging from 30 days in 
Nawalparasi and Nuwakot to 100 days in Mahottari, Palpa and Rautahat (Figure 16). The 
difference may depend on technical conditions, such as the complexity of works, and the 
number of bids to be assessed. But the lengthy evaluation process is clearly a matter of 
concern, because it would inflate the procurement costs and reduce the transparency of the 
process.  
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Figure 16. Efficiency in contract awarding by district  
 
 
In Nepal, ex post contract adjustments appear relatively moderate in financial terms, but 
many projects incurred significant delays. Infrastructure contracts are often far from 
complete and experience massive cost overruns and project delays. About 30 percent of PPP 
infrastructure transactions underwent renegotiation within two years after being awarded 
(Guasch, 2004). Some adjustments are necessary because of unanticipated technical 
difficulties, but others may be caused by the firms’ opportunistic low-balling strategy (Ware 
and others, 2007). In the transport sector, 9 out of 10 projects experienced cost overruns 
(Flyvbjerg and others, 2002). Project delays also add to cost overruns. Each year of delay 
would add on average $4.6 million to a project cost of $100 million in the transport sector 
(Flyvbjerg et al., 2004). 
 
In our sample, the road projects experienced considerable delays, but cost overruns were 
relatively small. Road contracts experienced a delay of 104 days on average. About 10 
percent of projects experienced more than 1 year of delay (Figure 17). About 45 percent of 
contracts incurred cost overruns, which range from several percent to 20 percent of the 
original contract amounts. About 20 contracts experienced cost underruns, mostly because 
the scope of the work was reduced (Figure 18). Since our sample projects are relatively 
simple rural road rehabilitation works, unexpected geotechnical issues are unlikely to cause 
cost overruns. The low-balling strategy may also be difficult, because there may be little 
room to justify cost adjustments due to technical reasons.  
 
But projects can be delayed for several reasons. Civil works may be delayed by heavy rain at 
the project sites, as discussed above. Another possibility is the low-balling strategy counting 
.
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on ex post project delays. Firms can propose an unrealistic schedule and then diminish their 
efforts to accomplish a work on schedule, causing delays.  
 
Figure 17. Project delays (number of days)  
 
 
Figure 18. Cost overruns relative to the original contract amount 
 
 
The contract performance differs across districts (Figure 19). Some districts are better at 
managing road contracts than others. The average cost overrun rates are 7 to 9 percent in 
Rautahat, Mahottari and Udayapur. But other districts, such as Banke and Kailali, have very 
small cost overruns less than 3 percent. The difference may be able to be explained for both 
internal and external reasons. On one hand, the government effectiveness may be different at 
the local level. The implementation capacities of district-level executing agencies, DDCs, are 
relatively high in our sampled districts. Still, their capabilities of managing and supervising 
contracted works may differ. On the other hand, weather and security issues are external 
factors that may affect the contract performance. These are generally beyond the capabilities 
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Figure 19. Cost overruns rate (%)  
 
 
Finally, the quality of roads that were upgraded and have been used differs across districts. 
We classified road conditions into four categories: (i) very uncomfortable, (ii) uncomfortable, 
(iii) fairly comfortable, and (iv) very comfortable (Table 3). This is a subjective rating but 
based on the field survey. Transport specialists actually drove on each road and evaluated the 
quality of roads. Despite our small sample size (per district), there is a clear trend: The 
quality of roads is relatively low around the nation’s capital, possibly because of the large 
traffic volume, weather conditions and other institutional factors (Figure 20).  
 
Table 3. Road quality rating criteria  
Rating  Condition 
4  Very comfortable throughout the entire road segment 
3  Fairly comfortable though occasionally jolting 
2  Uncomfortable with frequent shakes 
1  Very uncomfortable with continuous shakes and frequent slowdown and stops 
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III. EMPIRICAL MODELS AND DATA  
 
Bid equation  
 
To formally investigate the bidding behavior in the road procurement market, the following 
symmetric equilibrium bid function is considered based on the empirical auction literature 
(e.g., Porter and Zona, 1993; Gupta, 2002; Estache and Iimi, 2009, 2010):  
 
it i it it
t t t it
W ethinicity D dist
X ore secritybef num bid
   
  
   
  
' ) ( ln
' ln ln ln
4 3
2 1
  (1) 
 
where bidit is the amount of evaluated bid―both winning and losing― submitted by bidder i 
on road contract t. In the first-price sealed-bid format, both winning and losing bids are 
equally informative to estimate the equilibrium bid. num is the number of bidders who 
participated in the auction.  
 
The functional form is consistent with both auction theory and the existing empirical auction 
literature to capture the competition effect associated with num. In theory, the bidding 
strategy depends on the level of competition (e.g., Wilson, 1977; Milgrom and Weber, 1982; 
Wolfstetter, 1996). Under the standard setting, bids are expected to approach the lowest 
possible market price, as the number of bidders increases. This is because the probability that 
a bidder wins a contract with a given bid price would decline, as the number of participants 
increases. Under a certain distributional assumption for the private costs, the competition 
effect would diminish in a convex fashion, as the number of bidders increases. On the 
empirical side, auctions have been supportive of the competition effect and the effect tapers 
off quickly as the number of bidders grows. This is why many empirical auction papers 
model the effect under the logarithmic specification (e.g., Kessel, 1971; Brannman and others, 
1987; Paarsch, 1992; Iimi, 2006). As per Rezende (2005), the mapping between winning bids 
and the number of bidders is never linear.   
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At first glance, our sample data also seem to support the fact that competitive pressure exists 
in the road procurement market of Nepal. Although the level of competition is still low, the 
bids relative to engineering cost estimates tend to decline, as the competition increases 
(Figure 21). Of course, however, this is merely on a simple correlation basis; the competition 
effect has to be tested formally by estimating Equation (1).  
 
Figure 21. Competition and normalized bids 
 
 
To capture the impact of security issues, securitybefore is included, which is defined by the 
number of security-related incidents in a project host district during the three months prior to 
the auction. Note that this is constructed based on the information of incidents before each 
auction. This is the best information that potential bidders can know and incorporate in their 
bid calculation. Based on the past history of security incidents, they are assumed to estimate 
the likelihood of similar future incidents.  
 
X controls for other contract-specific technical characteristics, such as engineering cost 
estimates, length of roads, width of the road, thickness of the surface, and used materials (see 
Table 4 for details).
10 Note that the engineering cost estimate, which is calculated by DDCs 
prior to public tendering, is included in X to control the observable and unobservable size 
                                                 
10 A small but positive value is used to avoid logarithms of zero in independent variables, if they are zero.  
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effect of contracts.
11 X also includes a binary variable to indicate whether an auction includes 
the ex post quality evaluation process to exclude technically unreliable bids. About 90 
percent of our sampled auctions adopted this mechanism. To control other district-level 
unobservables, we include 18 dummy variables to indicate project districts.  
 
To account for heterogeneity across bidders, we include the distance―denoted by 
dist―between a project site and a contractor’s location, which is calculated as a straight line 
distance between the two district capitals. This is merely an approximation; it is not the exact 
distance that individual contractors would have to go and work if awarded. Intuitively, it 
would be more costly to supervise any public work from a distant location. In addition, as 
discussed, ethnicity may be one important factor determining the bidding strategy in Nepal. 
D(ethnicity) is set to one if the dominant ethnicity is the same between a project host district 
and a bidder’s home district. Dummy variables indicating bidders’ origin districts are also 
included in W. Firms may have unobserved comparative advantages. Local firms may have 
the cost and information advantage to supervise a project. Firms outside the district may have 
more work experience and stronger financial background.  
 
Table 4. Summary statistics  
Variable  Abbreviation  Obs  Mean  Std. 
Dev.  Min  Max 
Bid equation:  
 
         
 
Evaluated bid amount (NRs million)  bid  599  13.70  70.90  0.27  1410.00 
 
Number of bidders  num  106  5.86  4.04  1  15 
 
Number of security incidents during the 
three months prior to each tender 
securitybefore  106  10.95  10.21  0  38 
 
Line distance between project and firm 
origin districts 
dist  599  121.74  159.28  0  762.57 
 
Dummy for the same dominant ethnicity 
between project and firm origin districts 
D(ethnicity)  599  0.48  0.50  0  1 
 
Engineering cost estimate (NRs million)  cost  106  9.22  9.80  0.32  39.40 
 
Length of roads (km)  length  106  8.64  5.44  0.20  34.00 
 
Number of lanes  lane  106  1.05  0.21  1  2 
 
Thickness of road surface (mm)  thickness  106  7.11  9.33  0  50 
 
Gravel (m3)  gravel  106  2279.6  2900.4  0  18600.0 
                                                 
11 An alternative is to regress the normalized bid on contract characteristics. However, our model is considered 
more flexible, since this alternative specification assumes that the coefficient of the engineering cost estimate is 
equal to one, which is not necessarily the case in general.   
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Bitumen (kg)  bitumen  106  4762.4  14122.5  0  79029.6 
 
Earthworks (m3)  earth  106  6742.0  12665.7  0  93403.0 
 
Brickworks (m3)  brick  106  45.2  165.5  0  1204.1 
 
Gabion (m3)  gabion  106  238.6  856.4  0  8400.0 
 
Excavation (m3)  excavation  106  2952.1  5319.8  0  29266.6 
 
Cement concrete (m3)  cement  106  32.7  74.5  0  507.8 
 
Dummy variable for postqualification of 
bids 
D(postqualify)  106  0.92  0.28  0  1 
Bidder participation:              
 
Number of bidders purchasing bidding 
documents 
bdnum  118  22.53  17.93  4  107 
 
Price of bidding documents  bdcost  118  1547.6  1044.6  290.5  3576.1 
 
Bid preparation period (days)  bdpreptime  118  25.94  9.25  6  52 
Efficiency in contract awarding:              
 
Number of days required to award a 
contract 
dayscontracting  154  64.66  47.46  1  190 
Contract management:             
 
Cost overrun rate (percent)  overrun  155  3.73  6.25  -14.83  21.69 
 
Project delay (days)  delay  152  107.25  208.09  -76  1217 
 
Number of security incidents during the 
project implementation 
securityduring  152  33.86  47.06  0  280 
 
Precipitation during the project 
implementation (mm) 
rainduring  155  1652.22  1724.13  0  8774.2 
 
Difference between the winning bid and the 
second lowest bid (NRs million)  
lowball  142  -0.32  2.70  -29.60  6.29 
Project quality:             
 
Confortability rating (1 to 4)  rate  136  2.63  0.60  1  4 
 
Average traffic speed (km per houir)  speed  148  24.71  10.13  7.50  57.00 
 
Number of days for which a road has been 
used since the project completion 
age  136  794.32  497.60  11  2656 
 
Cumulative traffice since the project 
completion 
traffic  132  150802  153255  0  807884 
 
Number of security incidents after the 
project completion 
securityafter  133  81.94  79.05  0  377 
  
Precipitation after the project 
implementation (mm) 
rainafter  136  4953.4  3591.9  0.0  18223.2 
 
 
Bidder participation  
 
One of the most important empirical issues in estimating Equation (1) is that the number of 
bidders, num, is likely to be endogenous. Basic auction theory assumes it fixed. In reality, 
however, contractors may or may not enter the market for many reasons. Endogenous auction 
theory suggests that the entry cost would determine how many bidders would participate in  
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an auction. If a fixed positive cost is required for participating in an auction, bidders will 
enter until their expected profits are driven to the entry cost. At this level no more firms can 
expect nonnegative profits from new entry. Therefore, the bidder participation can be 
increased by reducing the entry costs or by raising the profit guaranteed to the least efficient 
bidder in the procurement market (McAfee and McMillan, 1987; Levin and Smith, 1994; 
Menezes and Monteiro, 2000). 
 
In practice, the bidder participation is a dynamic process. Some firms may decide not to enter 
the market, even though having shown initial interest. Other contractors may be disqualified 
for technical reasons, even if they wanted to participate in the competition. Our sample data 
show that the vast majority of firms in Nepal are giving up the opportunity to participate in 
public tenders and engage in public works. At the initial stage, about 23 firms on average 
bought the bidding documents; but only 6 firms applied to the formal process. After the 
technical evaluation, 5 bids were compared for determining the winner (Figure 22).  
 
Figure 22. Change in the number of bidders over the procurement process  
 
 
The question is why they decided not to apply for public tenders, though showing initial 
interest. To address this bidder participation problem, the following entry equation is 
considered: 
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Equation (2) can be estimated by a generalized count regression model, i.e., zero-truncated 
negative binomial model, because the observed number of bidders num is a positive integer 
and typical of count data (e.g., Li and Perrigne, 2003; Li and Zheng, 2006; Ohashi, 2009). 
The bidder participation is assumed to depend on security conditions, auction design, 
contract size, and other project-specific technical characteristics in X. As discussed, the 
impact of security issues is of particular concern in Nepal. Aggravating security might be 
discouraging firms from applying for public tenders. Z is a vector of instrument variables that 
particularly affect the firms’ entry decisions. The equation can also be estimated as a first 
stage regression, when the bid function is estimated with the number of bidders instrumented 
directly by Z.  
 
Another approach to estimate the bidders’ entry strategy is a binary probability model where 
each bidder’s decision about whether to apply for a public tender is regressed on explanatory 
variables. Letting a binary variable, entryit, be 1 if bidder i participates in auction t and zero 
otherwise, the probability of bidder i’s participating in auction t is:  
 
) , , ), ( , , ( 1 ) 0 Pr(
) , , ), ( , , ( ) 1 Pr(
t i t it it t it
t i t it it t it
Z W X ethnicity D dist fore securitybe entry
Z W X ethnicity D dist fore securitybe entry
   
  
  (3) 
 
In this case, bidder-specific characteristics, such as dist and ethnicity, can be incorporated in 
the model.  
 
Following the endogenous auction literature, three instruments are considered for Z: (i) the 
number of prospective contractors who can potentially apply for each tender, (ii) costs of 
bidding documents, and (iii) the length of bid preparation periods.  
 
The first instrument is the number of firms who bought the bidding documents (denoted by 
bdnum). This is considered as the maximum number of contenders that could participate in 
each auction. The underlying idea is the same as the use of the number of plan holders or  
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eligible bidders in the existing literature (e.g., Haile, 2001; Paarsch, 2007; De Silva, Dunne, 
Knkanamge & Kosmopoulou, 2008). In our case, the number of firms requesting the bidding 
documents or applying for the prequalification is determined prior to the submission of bids. 
As shown in Figure 20, some firms may not apply, and others may be disqualified. But the 
number of firms purchasing the bidding documents can be a good proxy of the potential pool 
of bidders.  
 
Second, the price of bidding documents (denoted by bdcost) is included in Z. Theory 
suggests that potential firms may not participate in public tenders, because there are some 
implicit and/or explicit costs of entry. The cost of bidding documents may not be 
economically significant but surely adds to the entry costs. In Nepal, bidding documents cost 
NRs300 to NRs3,500 with an average of NRs1,800 or $25 in our sample.  
 
Finally, the number of days granted contractors to prepare bids (denoted by bidpreptime) is 
included in Z. The longer bid preparation period can reduce the entry costs for potential 
contractors, particularly inexperienced firms. In addition, one of the yellow flags that may 
signal corruption or collusion is that an invitation to bid is published just a few days or a few 
weeks before bids have to be submitted (Ware et al., 2007). The World Bank Procurement 
Guidelines stipulate ―[g]enerally, not less than 6 (six) weeks from the date of the invitation to 
bid or the date of availability of bidding documents, whichever is later, shall be allowed for 
ICB. Where large works or complex items of equipment are involved, this period shall 
generally be not less than 12 (twelve) weeks to enable prospective bidders to conduct 
investigations before submitting their bids.‖
12 Our data seem to be supportive of the view that 






                                                 
12 The World Bank’s Guidelines: Procurement under IBRD Loans and IDA Credits, Clause 2.44 (pp. 21).  
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Efficiency in contracting  
 
One of the possible disadvantages of attracting more bids is that the administrative cost of 
procurers would increase with the number of applicants. Technical complexity in public 
works may also add to the time required to evaluate bidders and bids. However, the lengthy 
procurement process tends to lack transparency and raise procurement costs. Inefficient 
contracting would also lead to ex post adjustments, because of inflated input prices during 
the lengthy process.  
 
To measure the administrative efficiency in contracting, the following equation is considered: 
 
   t t t X fore securitybe num cting dayscontra ' ln ln ln 2 1      (4) 
 
where dayscontracting is defined by the number of days required to award a contract after 
the bid opening date. In Nepal, the time required to evaluate bids and award (or sign) a 
contract seems to increase proportionally with the number of bids received. On a simple 
correlation basis, one additional bid might add 12 days on average to the evaluation period 
(Figure 24).  
 
Contrary to our prior expectation, the time for the bid evaluation seems to proportionally 
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time to be awarded. This may raise concern about governance in public procurement and 
political interference, because there is a view that smaller contracts are often prepared using 
weaker, less formal, and less transparent procedures than those used for large contracts. As a 
result, the stakeholders involved have difficulty disputing formally, and this motivates 
corruption among both public officials and private contractors (World Bank, 2008a). If this is 
the case, it takes longer to negotiate with the lowest evaluated bidder and award a contract 
for smaller works.  
 
Related to the above, security-related incidents, such as intimidations and complaints, may 
retard the bid evaluation process. Note that our security variable, securitybefore, is an 
approximation, since there is no available data representing the actual incidence that is 
specifically related to the public road procurement. But our security proxy is expected to 
capture unobserved obstructions through the bid evaluation procedures.   
 
Figure 24. Average time between the bid opening and the contract award by level of competition  
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Contract management  
 
Good procurement and efficient contracting are necessary but may not be sufficient to ensure 
the delivery of quality services as originally planned. Many infrastructure projects in fact 
incur massive cost overruns and project delays. To examine why these post-award 
adjustments happened, the following equation is examined:  
 
t t t
t t t t t
X cting dayscontra
lowball num rainduring ring securitydu Y
  
   
  
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' ln
ln ln ln ln ln
5
4 3 2 1
  (5) 
 
where Y is a measurement of ex post adjustments, for which we use two variables: the rate of 
cost overruns relative to the original contract amount (denoted by overrun) and the number of 
days by which a project delayed (denoted by delay).  
 
Ex post adjustments depend on technical factors. For instance, ex post adjustments are likely 
to happen if contracts are technically complex and involve greater project risks. This will be 
captured by X in Equation (5). In Nepal, larger-size contracts seem to have more significant 
cost overruns. Cost overruns were minimal if the contract amount is less than NRs5 million 
or $70,000. Beyond that level, significant cost overruns are likely to occur (Figure 26). 
Similarly, larger contracts seem to be more likely to be delayed. The projects, of which the 
contract values exceed NRs5 million, delayed by 100-250 days on average (Figure 27).  
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Weather may be another potential determinant of post-award adjustments on the technical 
side. This is clearly an exogenous factor. In Nepal, heavy rain is one of the major constraints 
to project completion without delay. Thus, the amount of cumulative precipitation during the 
project implementation period, rainduring, is included in our models. On a simple correlation 
basis, our data appear to suggest that increased precipitation would cause cost overruns and 
project delays in the country (Figures 28 and 29).  
 
One may think that unexpected increases or decreases in precipitation are more relevant to 
post-award contract adjustments than actual levels of precipitation. The reason is that 
potential contractors may already have anticipated normal precipitation and reflected it to 
their bids. If this is the case, actual precipitation may not impact on cost overruns or project 
delays. To test this possibility, another variable unexpectedrain is constructed by subtracting 
the average monthly precipitation in the one-year period prior to each tender from the actual 
precipitation per month during the project implementation period.     
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Figure 29. Project delays and precipitation during project implementation  
 
 
As discussed, security is a major concern for contractors in Nepal. Strikes and intimidations 
would likely cause significant delays of rural road projects in Nepal. Thus, Equation (5) 
includes the number of security-related incidents during the project implementation period, 
denoted by securityduring. Note that this is not the same as the security variable that is used 
above. securityduring is defined by the number of incidents that actually happened during the 
project period. For the same reason as unexpectedrain, we also construct the number of 
unexpected security incidents during the project implementation period, compared to the 
monthly average during the one-year period prior to the bid submission (unexpectedsecurity).  
 
In our sample, one-third of the contracts experienced some delays due to security concern or 
strikes. If more than 40 security incidents occurred in a project district during the project 
implementation period, the project is likely to experience about 7 percent of cost overruns, 
which are relatively large in our sample (Figure 30). In addition, the projects are likely to 
delay as well (Figure 31).  
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Figure 31. Project delays and security incidents during project implementation  
 
 
Ex post contract adjustments may also be influenced by other institutional factors. One issue 
is that post-award contract adjustments may result from excess competition at the market. 
This is considered as a ―winner’s curse‖ phenomenon (e.g., Kagel and Levin, 1986; 
Klemperer, 1998; Hong and Shum, 2002; Athias and Nunez, 2006). If competition at the 
auction is intense, bidders are forced to be more aggressive. It may turn out that the winner 
was too optimistic. This will be captured by num. Our data indicate a certain possibility of 
this winner’s curse. At the low level of competition, bidders seem to be induced to be more 
aggressive under competitive pressure, which results in cost overruns (Figure 32). Intense 
competition may also result in project delays. This is observed partly at the relatively high 
level of competition involving more than 6 contenders (Figure 33).  
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Figure 33. Project delays and number of bidders  
 
 
A relevant view to the above is that post-award amendments would be caused by the bidders’ 
opportunistic behavior, such as low-balling (underbidding) strategy. This is a governance-
related problem. The current procurement systems often fail to prevent bidders from taking 
the low-balling strategy. Bidders may already anticipate that infrastructure contracts would 
be likely amended after the contract award. If so, bidders would have strong incentives to 
manipulate their bids, win the contract and then initiate renegotiation. This is often observed 
in competitive bidding for complex objects, such as infrastructure projects (Guasch, 2004; 
Ware and others, 2007).  
 
To test this hypothesis, the difference between the winning evaluated bid and the second 
lowest bid is calculated (lowbid).
13 In our data, there are a certain number of winning bids 
that substantially undercut the second lowest bidders. In most cases, the low balling 
ratio―relative to the second lowest bid amount―is less than 10 percent. But in some cases 
the difference exceeds 30 percent (Figure 34). That is, the winning bid is more than 30 
percent lower than the second lowest bid.
14 There are another set of abnormal cases where 
the winning bids were not the lowest evaluated bids, possibly due to some technical 
                                                 
13 An alternative variable that allows to test the low-balling hypothesis is the difference between the winning bid 
and the mean bid at that auction. This may have the advantage to see the case where the two lowest bidders 
would take the low-balling strategy. If this is the case, we cannot test the low-balling hypothesis by our low-
balling indicator, lowbid. We constructed and tested both variables. The meaning regression results have been 
generated only when the low-balling is measured by our lowbid.    
14 Our lowbid is constructed by comparing the winning bids with the second lowest bids that were deemed to be 
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reasons.
15 In these cases, the difference between the winning bid and the second lowest bid 
can be negative.  
 
Figure 34. Difference between winning bid and second lowest bid (%)   
 
 
Ex post adjustments can also be related to the effectiveness of procurers to evaluate bids and 
bidders. One common view is that procurers would be bothered with a number of addenda, if 
the bid qualification process is compromised at the bid evaluation stage. If this is the case, 
the shorter bid evaluation period would likely result in a larger number of contract 
amendments. This is tested by our inefficiency measurement, dayscontracting, in Equation 
(5). Note that contracting with incompetent and faithless contractors is costly in particular in 
infrastructure projects. For example, in Madagascar, three road contracts were re-bided 
because of the unacceptably low quality of the contractor’s performance. However, the 
contract cost turned out 37 percent higher than the original contract, when the contractor was 
reselected. This is because the costs of inputs, such as fuel and cement, increased during the 
procurement delay (Alexeeva, Padam, and Queiroz, 2008).  
 
Quality of projects 
 
Finally, the quality of project delivered is investigated:  
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) , , , , ( t t t t t t X rainafter ter securityaf traffic age f Q    (6) 
 
To measure the quality of roads, Q, we use two measurements. One is a subjective indicator, 
which is a rating to by transport specialists who drove on the road, i.e., ratet={1, 2, 3, 4}.
16 In 
this case, the ordered probit model is used to estimate Equation (6), because rate is an 
ordered discrete variable. Another measurement for Q is a more objective indicator, i.e., the 
average speed at which a normal vehicle actually ran on the rehabilitated or upgraded road 
(lnspeed). In this case, the equation can be estimated by the ordinary (log)linear regression.  
 
The quality of roads must of necessity depend on technical factors, such as the volume of 
traffic and how long the road has been used. In general, roads are deteriorating over time 
(Figure 35). age is the number of days for which the road has been used since the project was 
completed. In addition, heavy traffic would cause more road deterioration. The cumulative 
traffic volume, traffic, can be calculated by age multiplied by the average daily traffic (ADT), 
which was measured for each road segment by field visit.  
 
The road condition may depend on weather, especially, precipitation. More precipitation 
would cause deterioration on the road surface. The cumulative amount of precipitation after 
the project completion, rainafter, is included in the model.  
 
The quality of roads also depends on whether they are maintained periodically. As discussed 
above, roads are deteriorating anyway. The periodical maintenance is essential to keep the 
road quality high. To this end, security issues may be a potential problem. If security concern 
is severe, roads would not be able to be maintained properly. Therefore, the cumulative 
number of security-related incidents that occurred in each project district is also included in 
the model, denoted by securityafter.  
 
                                                 
16 The rating has four grades: (i) very uncomfortable with continuous shakes and frequent slowdown and stops, (ii) 
uncomfortable with frequent shakes, (iii) fairly comfortable though occasionally jolting, and (iv) very comfortable 
throughout the entire road segment.   
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Figure 35. Average road quality rating by road age  
 
Note: Rate 4 is the best quality and 1 is the lowest.  
 
 
IV. MAIN ESTIMATION RESULTS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS  
 
Equilibrium bid function  
 
The equilibrium bid function is first estimated by an ordinary least squares (OLS) technique. 
As theory predicts, the coefficient of the number of bidders is negative (Table 5). However, 
this may potentially be biased, because the endogeneity of the bidder participation is not 
controlled.  
 
With the endogeneity taken into account, the competition effect has been found to be 
significant. The two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression, in which the number of bidders is 
replaced with the predicted value from a zero-truncated negative binomial model, provides a 
consistent estimate of the bid function. The bid elasticity with respect to competition is 
estimated at -0.285. Thus, if competition is intensified by 10 percent, bids are estimated to 
decline by 2.8 percent. The instrumental variable (IV) regression where the number of 
bidders is directly instrumented by Z (and other exogenous variables) shows the same result. 
The more competition, the lower procurement costs. In this model, the elasticity is slightly 
















6 months to 
1 year
1 to 2 
years




Length of roads 
 
- 39 - 
The estimation results also show that security concern is a cost factor in Nepal. The 
coefficient of securitybefore is positive and significant across all the models. Thus, when 
security concern is high around a project area, firms would increase their bid prices. This 
implies that potential contractors would likely anticipate increases in project costs in insecure 
areas, either due to expected project delays or because they have to take security measures to 
prevent incidents. The elasticity of bid prices with respect to security incidence is about 0.23.  
 
Engineering cost estimates turned out to be a good proxy of the actual bid amounts, after 
other specification differences are controlled.
17 The estimated coefficient is close to one in all 
the models. This is a good indication for the procurement planning capacity of district-level 
road agencies, DDCs. Contrary to our prior expectation, the firm location does not seem to be 
an important factor to determine bid prices. One empirical possibility is that the potential 
distance effect may have been captured by a combination of bidder location and project site 
dummy variables. In fact, if all the dummy variables for bidder and project locations are 
excluded, the significance of lndist increases. But the p-value is 0.15, above the conventional 












                                                 
17 The principal component analysis identified the engineering cost estimate as the most influential variable 
among our independent variables representing technical specifications of projects. The vast majority of the 
differences in technical specifications can be explained by the engineering cost estimate, followed by some 
input variables, such as gravel and gabion.   
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Table 5. Estimated bid function    
   OLS       2SLS with ztnb     IV        
   Coef.  Std.  Err.     Coef.  Std. Err.     Coef.   Std. Err.   
ln num  -0.134  (0.050) ***  -0.285  (0.123) **  -0.338  (0.179) * 
ln securitybefore  0.234  (0.046) ***  0.237  (0.045) ***  0.234  (0.042) *** 
ln dist  0.045  (0.040) 
 
0.054  (0.039) 
 
0.037  (0.040) 
  D(ethnicity)  0.222  (0.156) 
 
0.258  (0.161) 
 
0.219  (0.165) 
  ln cost  0.959  (0.038) ***  1.015  (0.059) ***  0.999  (0.049) *** 
ln length  0.061  (0.048) 
 
0.067  (0.048) 
 
0.057  (0.050) 
  ln lane  0.092  (0.225) 
 
0.145  (0.236) 
 
0.102  (0.217) 
  ln thickness  0.030  (0.028) 
 
0.048  (0.030) 
 
0.037  (0.028) 
  ln gravel  0.017  (0.012) 
 
0.013  (0.013) 
 
0.019  (0.012) 
  ln bitumen  -0.028  (0.010) ***  -0.037  (0.012) ***  -0.029  (0.010) *** 
ln earth  -0.008  (0.013) 
 
0.014  (0.016) 
 
0.015  (0.022) 
  ln brick  0.014  (0.017) 
 
0.016  (0.017) 
 
0.012  (0.016) 
  ln gabion  0.006  (0.011) 
 
0.013  (0.012) 
 
0.012  (0.012) 
  ln exavate  0.003  (0.014) 
 
0.007  (0.015) 
 
0.006  (0.015) 
  ln cement  0.002  (0.017) 
 
-0.018  (0.023) 
 
-0.014  (0.022) 
  D(postqualify)  0.162  (0.153) 
 
0.022  (0.176) 
 
0.006  (0.220) 
  Constant  -0.910  (0.482) *  -1.658  (0.692) **  -1.301  (0.591) ** 
Obs.  599 
   
591 
   
591 
    R-squared  0.893 
   
0.891 
   
0.889 
    F-statistics  875.0 
   
808.1 
          Wald chi2 
           
38941 
    No. of dummy variables:  
                     Project districts  18 
   
18 
   
18 
       Bidders' home districts  25       25       25      
Note: The dependent variable is the number of bidders, num. Robust standard errors are shown in 
parentheses. *, **, *** indicate the statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
2SLS with ztnb = two stage least squares with the zero truncated negative binomial regression as a 
first stage. For this model, num is replaced with the predicted number of bidders from the first 
stage.  
 
Bidder participation  
 
To explore the bidders’ entry strategy, a generalized count regression is performed. In 
addition, a probit model is also estimated with the observations of not only bidding firms but 
also firms that showed interest but did not enter the market. The results indicate that higher 
costs of bidding documents deter potential entrants from entering the market (Table 6). In the 
negative binomial model, the coefficient is negative and significant. The implied elasticity 
associated with the document price is estimated at -0.51 (Table 7). Therefore, a 10 percent  
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reduction in costs of bidding documents could increase the number of bidders by 5 percent or 
invite 0.3 bidders more to public tenders.  
 
The longer bid preparation period helps to enhance competition. The coefficient of 
bidpreptime is significant and positive in the negative binomial model. The implied elasticity 
is 0.64. Thus, if the bid preparation period is extended by 10 percent, 6 percent more bidders 
would apply.  
 
According to the first stage regression of the instrumental variable (IV) estimator (presented 
above), more bidders would participate in the competition, if more firms are attracted at the 
initial stage of the public procurement. The coefficient of bdnum turned out to be 
significantly positive. This confirms a basic principle of the public procurement systems: The 
competition should open and nondiscriminatory with free entry. It is important to invite as 
many firms as possible to public tenders at the beginning.  
 
Larger contracts are more attractive to potential bidders. It is not straightforward to assess the 
scale effect in our model, because the size of contracts is measured by more than one variable. 
But when focusing on the marginal effect of engineering cost estimates, the coefficient is 
0.36. A 10 percent increase in cost estimates, holding everything else constant, would result 
in a 3-4 percent increase in bidder participation. It means that too small contracts are not 
profitable enough to motivate potential contractors to participate in public tendering. Recall 
that that the average contract amount is relatively small at about NRs 7.7 million or $110,000 
in Nepal and that bidders have to bear some (implicit) entry costs regardless of whether they 
win or lose the contract.  
 
Distance does matter to the bidder participation. According to our bid estimation results 
(Table 5), the firm location does not really matter to bid prices. But it does affect the bidders’ 
entry strategy. The first stage of the IV regression indicates that firms located far from a 
project location are less likely to decide to enter the market. The estimated elasticity is small 
at -0.06 but statistically significant. If the distance between a project site and potential  
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contractors increases by 50 km―approximately, a distance between two districts in Nepal, 
the expected number of bidders would decrease by about 2.5 percent. The probit model 
shows the similar results. The coefficient of lndist is negative at -0.19, which is statistically 
significant. Therefore, it can be concluded that the firm location does not matter directly to 
bid prices but affect the bidders’ participation decisions, which could in turn increase road 
procurement costs.   
 
Security issues discourage bidder participation. In Nepal, there has been concern about 
intimidation and threats by incumbent firms as well as strikes and abductions in local areas. 
Our estimation results are supportive of this. The probit model has a negative and significant 
coefficient on the security variable. Thus, if more security-related incidents are expected in a 
project district, a fewer firms would apply.  
 
Contrary to our expectation, ethnicity does not seem to affect the bidders’ entry decision. 
This may be attributable to possible noise in our data. Our ethnicity variable, D(ethnicity), is 
constructed based on the only district-level information. It is set to one if the dominant 
ethnicity is the same between a project host district and a bidder’s home district. It does not 
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Table 6. Estimation of bidder participation decision  
  
Zero truncated 
negative binomial    




   Coef.   Std. Err.    Coef.   Std. Err.    Coef.   Std. Err.   
bdnum  -0.002  (0.004) 
 
0.104  (0.058) * 
      bdcost  -0.0003  (0.0001) ***  0.178  (0.121) 
 
0.0002  (0.0001) 
  bidpreptime  0.025  (0.010) ***  0.321  (0.092) ***  -0.009  (0.009) 
  securitybefore  0.005  (0.008) 
 
-0.022  (0.050) 
 
-0.024  (0.007) *** 
ln dist 
     
-0.060  (0.027) **  -0.190  (0.050) *** 
D(ethnicity) 
     
-0.089  (0.136) 
 
-0.222  (0.207) 
  ln cost  0.362  (0.112) ***  0.018  (0.078) 
 
-0.102  (0.116) 
  ln length  0.052  (0.099) 
 
0.029  (0.070) 
 
0.161  (0.075) ** 
ln lane  -0.051  (0.370) 
 
0.001  (0.158) 
 
0.028  (0.412) 
  ln thickness  0.072  (0.060) 
 
-0.014  (0.043) 
 
0.100  (0.058) * 
ln gravel  -0.010  (0.027) 
 
-0.001  (0.012) 
 
-0.081  (0.034) ** 
ln bitumen  -0.010  (0.026) 
 
0.014  (0.015) 
 
-0.055  (0.024) ** 
ln earth  0.124  (0.038) ***  0.105  (0.016) ***  0.054  (0.032) * 
ln brick  -0.022  (0.028) 
 
-0.045  (0.014) ***  -0.021  (0.037) 
  ln gabion  0.054  (0.024) **  0.031  (0.013) **  0.038  (0.024) 
  ln excavate  0.006  (0.023) 
 
0.002  (0.010) 
 
-0.007  (0.016) 
  ln cement  -0.126  (0.032) ***  -0.079  (0.011) ***  -0.071  (0.028) ** 
D(postqualify)  -0.752  (0.218) ***  -0.716  (0.161) ***  0.653  (0.245) *** 
Constant  -4.501  (1.330) ***  -1.468  (0.763) *  0.570  (1.661)   
Obs.  118 
   
591 
   
2119 
    Wald chi2  1498.88 
         
436.39 
    R-squared 
     
0.779 
          F-statistics 
     
305.25 
          Pseudo R2 
           
0.180 
    No. of dummy variables:  
             Project districts  18 
   
18 
   
17 
       Bidders' home districts  0       25       28      
Note: The dependent variable is the number of bidders, num, for the zero truncated negative binomial 
regression. For the 1st stage of the instrumental variable regression, the first four independent variables are 
in logarithm. In the probit model, the dependent variable is a binary variable which is set to 1 if a potential 
contractor participates in competitive bidding, and zero otherwise. Robust standard errors are shown in 
parentheses. *, **, *** indicate the statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.  
 
 





Err.    
bdnum  -0.051  (0.088) 
  bdcost  -0.506  (0.184)  *** 
bidpreptime  0.640  (0.250)  *** 
securitybefore  0.053  (0.086) 
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Efficiency in contracting  
 
One potential disadvantage of increasing the size of the contract to intensify competition is 
that the administrative costs of evaluating bids and bidders are likely to go up. Our evidence 
is supportive of this. In the contract efficiency regressions, the coefficient of engineering cost 
estimates has been found positive and significant in all the models (Table 8). There are two 
reasons for this. First, it takes longer to evaluate bids and bidders in large contracts; large-
scale works tend to be financially valuable and technically complex. As a result, the size of 
contracts is an important determinant of the procurement efficiency.  
 
Second, larger contracts attract more contenders, as shown above. Firms are more interested 
in public tenders for large packages. Consequently, increased competition adds to the 
evaluation costs of procurers. This effect may be captured partly by the coefficient on lncost, 
because of the correlation between the two variables. The coefficient of the number of 
bidders is insignificant in the first three specifications of Table 8. But when all the variables 
representing the scale of contracts are excluded from the model, the effect of increased 
competition becomes clearer; the more bidders, the less efficient contracting process. This is 
simply because it takes more time to evaluate more bids and bidders.  
 
No evidence is found that security issues would retard the bid evaluation process. In all the 
regressions on dayscontracting, the coefficient of securitybefore is found insignificant. There 
may be a data issue here. Recall that our security variable is constructed to represent the 
general level of security concern at the district level. It may or may not be linked explicitly to 
security incidents related to the public road procurement. However, as far as our data are 
concerned, the bid evaluation and contract award process per se does not seem to be affected 
directly by possible intimidations or any other complaints from bidders. Rather, security is a 
matter of more vital concern to the bidder participation, as discussed above (Table 6).  
 
(In)Efficiency in contract awarding crucially depends on district-specific unobservables, such 
as government effectiveness and procurers’ capacity. In the models, there are significant  
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fixed effects across districts. Formally, the Wald test statistic for the first column model is 
estimated at 3.28, which is greater than the F statistic with 18 numerator and 86 denominator 
degrees of freedom. Using the district of Banke as a baseline, Dhading and Nuwakot are 
clearly efficient than other districts. By contrast, Kapilvastu and Palpa look less efficient for 





Table 8. OLS estimation of efficiency in contract awarding  
  
Coef.   Std. 
Err.     Coef.   Std. 
Err.     Coef.   Std. 
Err.   
Coef.   Std. 
Err.   
Coef.   Std. 
Err.   
ln num  -0.110  (0.145)    -0.060  (0.118)             0.591  (0.116) ***  0.575  (0.140) *** 
ln securitybefore  0.065  (0.112) 
       
0.071  (0.113) 
       
-0.044  (0.126) 
  ln cost  0.534  (0.164) ***  0.549  (0.114) ***  0.509  (0.162) *** 
            ln length  -0.123  (0.132) 
 
-0.249  (0.107) **  -0.125  (0.130) 
              ln lane  -0.131  (0.375) 
 
-0.098  (0.393) 
 
-0.133  (0.368) 
              ln thickness  -0.065  (0.122) 
 
-0.129  (0.090) 
 
-0.067  (0.125) 
              ln gravel  0.065  (0.059) 
 
0.015  (0.045) 
 
0.065  (0.059) 
              ln bitumen  0.020  (0.052) 
 
0.012  (0.044) 
 
0.022  (0.054) 
              ln earth  -0.052  (0.058) 
 
0.007  (0.046) 
 
-0.060  (0.059) 
              ln brick  0.002  (0.054) 
 
0.073  (0.061) 
 
0.003  (0.054) 
              ln gabion  0.053  (0.039) 
 
-0.003  (0.029) 
 
0.048  (0.037) 
              ln excavate  0.022  (0.025) 
 
0.031  (0.019) 
 
0.019  (0.024) 
              ln cement  -0.138  (0.042) ***  -0.114  (0.031) ***  -0.129  (0.038) *** 
            D(postqualify)  -0.145  (0.411) 
 
0.369  (0.324) 
 
-0.065  (0.409) 
 
1.510  (0.295) ***  1.149  (0.311) *** 
Constant  -4.064  (2.084) **  -4.626  (1.427) ***  -3.871  (2.076) *  1.026  (0.402) **  1.453  (0.662) ** 
Obs.  119       154       119       155       120      
R-squared  0.710 
   
0.719 
   
0.708 
   
0.463 
   
0.496 
    F-statistics  19.80 
   
24.44 
   
20.34 
   
13.40 
   
23.20 
    No. of dummy variables:  
                                 Project districts  18       18       18       18       18      
Note: The dependent variable is the number of days required to award a contract after the bid openning, dayscontracting. Robust standard 
errors are shown in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate the statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.  
 
 Contract management  
 
Security has been found the most important factor that caused ex post contract 
amendments―both cost overruns and project delays. In the regressions on cost overruns, the 
coefficient of ln securityduring is found significantly positive at 1.24 (Table 9). But 
unexpectedsecurity does not have a significant coefficient. Thus, road projects would 
experience large cost overruns, if more security-related incidents happened during the 
implementation period, even though they were anticipated prior to public tendering. The 
implied elasticity is about 0.33.  
 
In addition, security incidents have a positive and significant impact on ln Delay (Table 10). 
Not surprisingly, security incidents would cause project delays. While security incidents 
occur, a project will be interrupted. The elasticity is estimated at about 1.1. If a contractor is 
faced with 10 percent more incidents, the project would be delayed by the same percentage 
or for 2-3 weeks.
18  
 
Heavy rainfall causes project delays as well. But it may not increase cost overruns. This is 
consistent with our expectation. In rural road projects, which are technically simple, it is less 
likely that contractors would encounter unexpected geotechnical issues. Rather, heavy rain 
would likely delay civil works. In the regression on delays, rainduring has a positive and 
significant coefficient of 0.32. unexpectedrain also has a significant coefficient. Thus, the 
project delay would increase with precipitation during the project implementation. This is a 
reasonable finding, because road work cannot be carried out when it rains. If it rains 10 
percent more than usual, the project would delay additionally by 3 percent or 3 days, on top 
of an average project delay of 107 days.  
 
Intense competition in public tendering results in mitigating the risk of post contract 
amendments. The number of bidders has a negative coefficient in all the specifications. The 
                                                 
18 In the sample, the original project duration is about 185 days on average, and the actual project duration is 
about 290 days. The average project delay is about 107 days.    
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coefficient is particularly significant in the regressions on cost overruns. It is interpreted as 
one of the positive benefits from competitive pressure in the market. Contractors that were 
selected through intense competitive bidding are more likely to be well disciplined and 
therefore less likely to provoke renegotiation about costs or miss the project completion date. 
The work is more likely to be delivered on schedule, except in the case that exogenous 
factors, such as security events and weather, occur.  
 
Notably, this finding contradicts the winner’s curse hypothesis that excessive competition 
would result in more ex post contract amendments. Our finding suggests that intense 
competition is conducive to avoiding post contract adjustment. This is more consistent with 
the independent private value paradigm of auction theory, in which competition plays an 
important role in lowering the equilibrium bid. In addition, contracts are unlikely to be 
amended, because bidders know their own values attached to an object.
19  
 
The low-balling strategy will end up with a retard of projects. The coefficient of lowball is 
found significant and positive in the regressions on project delays. Recall that lowball is 
defined by the difference between the winning bids and the second lowest bids. Thus, a 
positive coefficient means that more delays will happen if the winning bid undercuts the 
second price significantly. On the other hand, there is no evidence that the low-balling 
strategy would cause cost overruns. The coefficient is positive but not significant.  
 
The coefficient of dayscontracting, a proxy of inefficiency in contracting, is found positive 
and significant in both cost overrun and project delay equations. This is inconsistent with the 
view that procurers would be bothered with post contract adjustments if the qualities of bids 
and bidders are not carefully assessed before the contract award. Worse, many post 
adjustments will happen even if procurers spend more time for the bid evaluation. 
                                                 
19 By contrast, under the common value paradigm, bidders do not ex ante know the true value of an object. As a 
result, bidders may over- or under-estimate the value, initiating ex post contract amendments (e.g., Kagel and 
Levin, 1986; Klemperer, 1998; Hong and Shum, 2002; Athias and Nunez, 2006). With such a case anticipated, 
the equilibrium bid may first decrease with the number of bidders, reflecting increased competition, but with 
more competition, bidders will recognize the risk of underestimating the true project costs and raise their bids 
(Paarsch, 1992).   
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Underlying reasons remain open to discussion. One possibility is that poor governance would 
likely loosen contractors’ incentives and at the same time increase the risk of corruption and 
collusion in the procurement process. As discussed, the lengthy contract process is a yellow 
flag signaling weak governance in public procurement systems. At the same time, poor 
governance would allow contractors to exploit the opportunities of strategic cost overruns 
and project delays.  
 
Overall, security stands out as the most important factor to explain ex post contract 
adjustments. Security issues cause both cost overruns and project delays. Competitive 
pressure will help to prevent post contract amendments, especially cost overruns. The low-
balling strategy will increase the risk of project delays.    
 
Regarding non-institutional variables, the estimation results consistently show that two inputs 
would bring about cost overruns: bitumen and earthworks. Bitumen is a relatively expensive 
input in rural road projects of Nepal, and its costs may be sensitive to external factors, such 
as energy prices. As a result, bitumen would emerge as an important cost overrun factor. In 
our sample, about half of the works used some bitumen. Earthworks are preparatory works, 
including land grading and leveling, for roads. They are one of the main work activities in 
our rural road projects. Depending on project site conditions, unanticipated additional 
earthworks may be required. In the sample, almost all contracts include some earthworks, 
except for 6 contracts. The implication is that the quality of the bidding documents is 
important. If a project is predefined correctly with proper specifications, these cost overruns 
will be less likely to occur.  
 
Larger contracts would bring about larger post-award adjustments, particularly project delays. 
This may be simply because larger projects are technically complex. The coefficient of lncost 
in the last column model of Table 10 is significantly positive at 0.71. Hence, larger contracts 
would undergo more delays. A 10 percent larger contract would result in increasing project 
delays by 7 percent, assuming that everything else is constant, 
  
 
Table 9. OLS estimation of cost overruns  
  
Coef.   Std. Err.  Coef.   Std. Err.  Coef.   Std. Err.  Coef.   Std. Err.  Coef.   Std. Err.  Coef.   Std. Err.  Coef.   Std. Err.  Coef.   Std. Err. 
ln securityduring  1.245  (0.645) ** 
                                   
2.022  (0.698) *** 
ln unexpectedsecurity 
     
-0.157  0.5009 
                                      ln rainduring 
           
-0.316  (0.265) 
                         
-1.094  (0.336) *** 
ln unexpectedrain 
                 
-0.193  (0.204) 
                          ln num 
                       
-2.046  (0.710) *** 
           
-3.701  (0.975) *** 
ln lowbid 
                             
0.050  (0.097) 
       
0.024  (0.092) 
  ln dayscontracting 
                                   
1.460  (0.600) **  0.617  (0.755) 
  ln cost  -0.032  (0.821) 
 
0.1131  0.866 
 
0.945  (0.755) 
 
0.842  (0.735) 
 
0.990  (0.658) 
 
0.834  (0.758) 
 
0.029  (0.755) 
 
0.846  (0.869) 
  ln length  -1.821  (0.727) **  -1.563  0.7743 **  -1.899  (0.687) ***  -1.749  (0.691) **  -1.671  (0.649) ***  -1.629  (0.863) *  -1.395  (0.702) **  -1.727  (0.750) ** 
ln lane  1.072  (3.606) 
 
0.0911  4.6242 
 
2.028  (3.540) 
 
2.409  (3.575) 
 
1.485  (3.448) 
 
1.705  (3.632) 
 
2.410  (3.477) 
 
0.262  (3.918) 
  ln thickness  -0.241  (0.493) 
 
0.3371  0.6176 
 
-0.372  (0.508) 
 
-0.227  (0.509) 
 
-0.229  (0.482) 
 
-0.738  (0.522) 
 
-0.170  (0.513) 
 
-0.128  (0.496) 
  ln gravel  -0.163  (0.220) 
 
0.1492  0.2943 
 
-0.038  (0.203) 
 
-0.085  (0.221) 
 
-0.053  (0.217) 
 
-0.151  (0.219) 
 
-0.089  (0.218) 
 
-0.231  (0.210) 
  ln bitumen  0.941  (0.242) ***  0.9046  0.2979 ***  0.966  (0.271) ***  0.924  (0.263) ***  0.903  (0.249) ***  1.008  (0.265) ***  0.928  (0.269) ***  0.909  (0.246) *** 
ln earth  0.676  (0.299) **  0.4198  0.3362 
 
0.505  (0.250) **  0.515  (0.253) **  0.691  (0.260) ***  0.621  (0.260) **  0.527  (0.248) **  0.855  (0.325) *** 
ln brick  -0.242  (0.396) 
 
0.0338  0.5058 
 
0.103  (0.399) 
 
0.119  (0.401) 
 
0.008  (0.377) 
 
-0.013  (0.431) 
 
-0.002  (0.391) 
 
-0.343  (0.416) 
  ln gabion  -0.071  (0.232) 
 
0.2795  0.3225 
 
-0.097  (0.231) 
 
-0.127  (0.226) 
 
0.004  (0.229) 
 
-0.163  (0.238) 
 
-0.108  (0.222) 
 
0.014  (0.234) 
  ln exavate  -0.199  (0.131) 
 
-0.041  0.1624 
 
-0.168  (0.135) 
 
-0.186  (0.138) 
 
-0.127  (0.128) 
 
-0.141  (0.151) 
 
-0.227  (0.141) *  -0.191  (0.137) 
  ln cement  0.224  (0.234) 
 
0.0198  0.3035 
 
0.049  (0.240) 
 
0.038  (0.239) 
 
0.013  (0.224) 
 
0.052  (0.244) 
 
0.226  (0.252) 
 
0.059  (0.250) 
  D(postqualify)  3.954  (2.329) *  0.2357  1.9315 
 
4.056  (2.070) **  3.693  (2.137) *  3.084  (2.075) 
 
3.911  (2.209) *  3.037  (2.033) 
 
4.545  (2.577) * 
Constant  -6.759  (9.272)    -1.570  (9.934)    -13.976  (8.553) *  -14.052  (8.866)    -14.925  (7.980) *  -15.158  (9.170) *  -7.742  (8.766)    -12.152  (9.071)   
Obs.  152       95 
 
   155 
 
   154       155       142       154       138      
R-squared  0.558 
   
0.638 
   
0.540 
   
0.542 
   
0.559 
   
0.544 
   
0.556 
   
0.624 
    F-statistics  9.68 
   
38.17 
   
9.29 
   
8.77 
   
9.61 
   
8.54 
   
8.14 
   
10.58 
    No. of dummy 
variables:  
                                                   Project districts  18       18       18       18       18       18       18       18      
Note: The dependent variable is the cost overrun rate, overrun. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate the statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.   
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Table 10. OLS estimation of project delays  
  
Coef.   Std. Err.  Coef.   Std. Err.  Coef.   Std. Err.  Coef.   Std. Err.  Coef.   Std. Err.  Coef.   Std. Err.  Coef.   Std. Err.  Coef.   Std. Err. 
ln securityduring  1.131  (0.273) *** 
                                   
1.133  (0.243) *** 
ln unexpectedsecurity 
     
0.047  (0.191) 
                                      ln rainduring 
           
0.326  (0.150) ** 
                       
0.043  (0.162) 
  ln unexpectedrain 
                 
0.170  (0.090) * 
                        ln num 
                       
-0.509  (0.346) 
             
-0.504  (0.355) 
  ln lowbid 
                             
0.089  (0.039) ** 
     
0.105  (0.035) *** 
ln dayscontracting 
                                   
0.820  (0.252) ***  0.497  (0.369) 
  ln cost  1.000  (0.299) ***  1.424  (0.452) ***  1.449  (0.297) ***  1.707  (0.275) ***  1.776  (0.280) ***  1.519  (0.305) ***  1.286  (0.317) ***  0.706  (0.325) ** 
ln length  -0.962  (0.283) ***  -0.002  (0.340) 
 
-0.851  (0.312) ***  -0.980  (0.344) ***  -0.943  (0.340) ***  -1.423  (0.295) ***  -0.759  (0.314) **  -1.072  (0.283) *** 
ln lane  0.902  (2.356) 
 
0.725  (2.036) 
 
1.500  (2.157) 
 
1.422  (2.215) 
 
1.339  (2.044) 
 
1.844  (2.053) 
 
1.599  (2.042) 
 
1.388  (2.416) 
  ln thickness  -0.326  (0.182) *  0.173  (0.350) 
 
-0.393  (0.202) *  -0.521  (0.223) **  -0.365  (0.201) *  -0.329  (0.242) 
 
-0.290  (0.188) 
 
-0.138  (0.193) 
  ln gravel  -0.024  (0.116) 
 
0.067  (0.127) 
 
0.022  (0.116) 
 
0.048  (0.113) 
 
0.035  (0.114) 
 
0.063  (0.121) 
 
0.020  (0.125) 
 
-0.072  (0.116) 
  ln bitumen  -0.113  (0.081) 
 
-0.526  (0.160) ***  -0.123  (0.094) 
 
-0.094  (0.095) 
 
-0.126  (0.098) 
 
-0.067  (0.102) 
 
-0.125  (0.087) 
 
-0.086  (0.086) 
  ln earth  -0.195  (0.118) *  -0.392  (0.135) ***  -0.262  (0.105) **  -0.298  (0.104) ***  -0.274  (0.100) ***  -0.253  (0.105) **  -0.316  (0.101) ***  -0.107  (0.128) 
  ln brick  -0.122  (0.127) 
 
-0.029  (0.157) 
 
0.042  (0.125) 
 
0.080  (0.125) 
 
0.068  (0.124) 
 
0.171  (0.115) 
 
0.030  (0.115) 
 
-0.064  (0.115) 
  ln gabion  -0.112  (0.084) 
 
0.012  (0.119) 
 
-0.135  (0.090) 
 
-0.121  (0.093) 
 
-0.101  (0.099) 
 
-0.126  (0.095) 
 
-0.125  (0.089) 
 
-0.083  (0.084) 
  ln excavate  0.051  (0.058) 
 
0.070  (0.094) 
 
0.061  (0.058) 
 
0.070  (0.055) 
 
0.081  (0.055) 
 
0.061  (0.061) 
 
0.043  (0.059) 
 
0.022  (0.059) 
  ln cement  -0.207  (0.090) **  -0.183  (0.165) 
 
-0.280  (0.096) ***  -0.297  (0.097) ***  -0.332  (0.093) ***  -0.279  (0.096) ***  -0.226  (0.099) **  -0.136  (0.090) 
  D(postqualify)  0.720  (0.866) 
 
2.142  (0.956) **  0.474  (0.846) 
 
0.707  (0.811) 
 
0.649  (0.782) 
 
0.936  (0.917) 
 
0.464  (0.773) 
 
0.761  (0.973) 
  Constant  -12.081  (3.499) ***  -17.331  (5.110) ***  -17.007  (3.405) ***  -18.727  (3.370) ***  -18.616  (3.396) ***  -16.374  (3.602) ***  -14.692  (3.730) ***  -10.597  (3.559) *** 
Obs.  152       95       155       154       155       142       154       138      
R-squared  0.607 
   
0.513 
   
0.562 
   
0.553 
   
0.548 
   
0.613 
   
0.572 
   
0.709 
    F-statistics  18.40 
   
94.16 
   
12.91 
   
13.46 
   
12.16 
   
12.77 
   
12.85 
   
23.39 
    No. of dummy 
variables:  
                                                   Project districts  18       18       18       18       18       18       18       18      
Note: The dependent variable is the number of days of project delays in logarithm, ln delay. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate the statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1%, respectively.  
  
Quality of projects delivered  
 
To examine the quality of roads the ordered probit regressions are performed. The results 
show that it depends on the duration of use of upgraded roads, traffic volume, precipitation 
and security issues (Table 11). In the ordered probit model with age, the road quality ratings 
are estimated to deteriorate over time; the coefficient is -0.57. This is interpreted as a 
depreciation rate of road assets affected by various factors. The results also show that traffic 
damages road surfaces; the quality ratings would decline, as the volume of traffic increases. 
Precipitation is also estimated to have a negative effect on the road quality. This is simply 
because precipitation also degrades road surfaces.  
 
Security incidents have been found the most important factor. The number of security 
incidents that occurred after the project completion has a negative and significant coefficient 
of -0.42. In addition, when all these factors are taken into account simultaneously, the 
security impact stands as a dominant determinant. This may be interpreted slightly differently 
than the other variables discussed above. It implies that periodical road maintenance would 
be delayed or hampered where security concern is high. As a result, the road quality would 
deteriorate and be rated as poor. The finding is consistent with a view that periodical 
maintenance is essential to keep the quality of roads high in the existing literature. Especially, 
roads surfaces are considered vulnerable in Nepal, because of their unpaved surfaces as well 
as raininess of the country.  
 
The quality of roads also depends on road specifications. Roads built to a high specification 
are more likely to be rated high. The coefficients of lane and thickness are consistently 
positive and significant across the models. Thus, not surprisingly, the road conditions would 
be good if the road surface is thicker. Wider roads also normally follow higher standards and 
thus tend to be in good condition.  
  
 
- 53 - 
When the quality is measured by the average speed of the traffic, the security issue is once 
again found an important constraint to maintain the road conditions (Table 12). In addition, 
the road quality deteriorates with precipitation, as expected. These effects are significant in 
the last column model.  
 
One unexpected result is that the average speed increases with the traffic volume. Our prior 
expectation is that the quality of roads decreases with the traffic volume. It seems that there 
is an endogeneity problem in this result. A good quality road would allow to drive faster, 
which would also motivate more people to use the road. As a result, the traffic volume is 





Table 11. Ordered probit regression of road quality rating  
  
Coef.   Std. Err.  Coef.   Std. Err.  Coef.   Std. Err.  Coef.   Std. Err.  Coef.   Std. Err. 
ln age  -0.567  (0.162) *** 
                        ln traffic 
     
-0.328  (0.099) *** 
           
0.200  (0.257) 
  ln securityafter 
           
-0.429  (0.133) *** 
     
-0.679  (0.391) * 
ln rainafter 
                 
-0.557  (0.146) ***  -0.290  (0.291) 
  ln cost  0.035  (0.324) 
 
0.077  (0.340) 
 
0.073  (0.311) 
 
0.053  (0.322) 
 
0.028  (0.332) 
  ln length  -0.151  (0.259) 
 
-0.128  (0.269) 
 
-0.088  (0.260) 
 
-0.154  (0.260) 
 
-0.106  (0.274) 
  ln lane  3.329  (0.915) ***  4.086  (0.966) ***  3.017  (0.907) ***  3.631  (0.920) ***  3.904  (0.987) *** 
ln thickness  0.390  (0.176) **  0.365  (0.176) **  0.387  (0.175) **  0.393  (0.180) **  0.287  (0.171) * 
ln gravel  0.071  (0.074) 
 
0.081  (0.083) 
 
0.088  (0.079) 
 
0.065  (0.075) 
 
0.086  (0.087) 
  ln bitumen  -0.055  (0.075) 
 
-0.057  (0.075) 
 
-0.061  (0.075) 
 
-0.054  (0.075) 
 
-0.056  (0.074) 
  ln earth  0.006  (0.076) 
 
0.050  (0.079) 
 
-0.040  (0.080) 
 
0.006  (0.075) 
 
0.024  (0.084) 
  ln brick  0.063  (0.112) 
 
0.088  (0.119) 
 
0.026  (0.131) 
 
0.073  (0.118) 
 
0.069  (0.160) 
  ln gabion  0.141  (0.097) 
 
0.082  (0.093) 
 
0.141  (0.095) 
 
0.131  (0.097) 
 
0.121  (0.096) 
  ln excavate  -0.110  (0.049) **  -0.144  (0.048) ***  -0.115  (0.049) **  -0.122  (0.050) **  -0.144  (0.047) *** 
ln cement  0.010  (0.090) 
 
-0.004  (0.096) 
 
0.015  (0.092) 
 
0.013  (0.093) 
 
-0.039  (0.108) 
  D(postqualify)  0.396  (0.657) 
 
-0.005  (0.673) 
 
0.152  (0.661) 
 
0.338  (0.655) 
 
-0.151  (0.682) 
  Obs.  136       128       133       136       125      
Wald chi2  181.11 
   
185.06 
   
188.48 
   
196.97 
   
201.52 
    Pseudo R2  0.482 
   
0.512 
   
0.480 
   
0.485 
   
0.522 
    No. of dummy variables:  
                               Project districts  18       18       18       18       18      
Note: The dependent variable is the quality rating. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate the 
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Table 12. OLS estimation of average traffic speed  
  
Coef.   Std. Err.  Coef.   Std. Err.  Coef.   Std. Err.  Coef.   Std. Err.  Coef.   Std. Err. 
ln Age  0.007  (0.042) 
                          ln Traffic 
     
0.044  (0.017) ** 
           
0.207  (0.042) *** 
ln securityafter 
           
0.0002  (0.037) 
       
-0.271  (0.070) *** 
ln rainafter 
                 
-0.005  (0.032) 
 
-0.044  (0.023) * 
ln cost  0.082  (0.057) 
 
0.068  (0.058) 
 
0.081  (0.057) 
 
0.082  (0.057) 
 
0.042  (0.055) 
  ln length  0.120  (0.038) ***  0.160  (0.039) ***  0.114  (0.037) ***  0.115  (0.037) ***  0.181  (0.032) *** 
ln lane  0.244  (0.267) 
 
0.286  (0.248) 
 
0.224  (0.270) 
 
0.248  (0.269) 
 
0.333  (0.164) ** 
ln thickness  0.010  (0.032) 
 
0.053  (0.029) *  0.008  (0.032) 
 
0.009  (0.031) 
 
0.051  (0.029) * 
ln gravel  0.014  (0.015) 
 
0.010  (0.014) 
 
0.015  (0.016) 
 
0.014  (0.015) 
 
0.003  (0.016) 
  ln bitumen  -0.031  (0.013) **  -0.037  (0.013) ***  -0.030  (0.013) **  -0.030  (0.013) **  -0.032  (0.012) *** 
ln earth  -0.019  (0.017) 
 
-0.022  (0.017) 
 
-0.019  (0.020) 
 
-0.018  (0.017) 
 
-0.018  (0.017) 
  ln brick  -0.014  (0.018) 
 
0.004  (0.018) 
 
-0.019  (0.018) 
 
-0.014  (0.017) 
 
0.015  (0.016) 
  ln gabion  0.001  (0.014) 
 
-0.003  (0.014) 
 
0.002  (0.013) 
 
0.002  (0.013) 
 
0.006  (0.013) 
  ln excavate  -0.004  (0.010) 
 
-0.008  (0.009) 
 
-0.004  (0.010) 
 
-0.004  (0.010) 
 
-0.008  (0.009) 
  ln cement  0.015  (0.014) 
 
0.016  (0.014) 
 
0.016  (0.014) 
 
0.015  (0.014) 
 
0.011  (0.014) 
  D(postqualify)  -0.081  (0.104) 
 
-0.028  (0.109) 
 
-0.100  (0.107) 
 
-0.085  (0.104) 
 
0.004  (0.094) 
  Constant  1.754  (0.738) **  1.128  (0.747) 
 
1.850  (0.699) ***  1.849  (0.734) **  0.400  (0.812) 
  Obs.  148       141       145       148       138      
R-squared  0.478 
   
0.714 
   
0.675 
   
0.678 
   
0.759 
    F-statistics  12.86 
   
13.48 
   
13.33 
   
12.97 
   
19.41 
    No. of dummy variables:  
                               Project districts  18       18       18       18       18      
Note: The dependent variable is the average speed in logarithm. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. *, **, *** 
indicate the statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. Due to multicollinearity, ln Age is omitted from the last 
column model.  
  
V. POLICY DISCUSSION  
 
There are a variety of findings in our estimation results. Important, our empirical analysis 
provides quantitative assessment to suggest possible policy options for improving the 
performance of public road procurement and contracting. Some important policy 
implications are as follows:  
 
Competition needs to be enhanced particularly in government owned projects  
 
Competition is the most important factor to bring down road procurement costs. The level of 
competition is clearly insufficient in some public tenders in Nepal. In particular in 
government owned projects, the average competition is about 4.5, unfavorably compared to 
an average of 7.3 in World Bank financed projects (Table 13). Greater efforts are required to 
invite more potential contractors in the government’s projects. If the competition is increased 
to the same level as the World Bank projects, the procurement costs of government-financed 
roads are estimated to decline by about 20 percent.
20 If this is applied uniformly to our 
sample projects, which is composed of 155 road upgrading works, about NRs220 million or 
$3 million could be saved.  
 
The optimal level of competition may be seven bidders or more in the Nepal case. How many 
bidders are required for an auction to be sufficiently competitive is a difficult question. It 
must depend on individual cases and policy objectives to be achieved. If we apply one 
analytical approach that defines competition as sufficient when the number of bids exceeds 
(Estache and Iimi, 2011), the optimal level that could generate a statistically significant 
impact on the equilibrium bid strategy is estimated at seven bidders or more in our case. The 
IV estimation with a partially nonlinear specification for the number of bidders, in which 
num is replaced with a set of the dummy variables for individual num,
21 shows that the 
                                                 
20 This is calculated based on the IV result.  
21 This is considered as the most flexible functional form to specify the competition effect.   
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equilibrium bid broadly decreases with the number of bidders and that the statistical 
significance would taper off once the number of bidders reaches seven (Figure 36). About 
half of World Bank financed projects do not reach this level of competition. Nearly 80 
percent of government financed projects are estimated to have insufficient competition 
(Figure 37). Too small contracts are often less attractive to firms, because of high transaction 
costs, which would be incurred regardless of the size of projects.  
 
Table 13. Average number of bidders  
   Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
World Bank project  82  7.28  3.78  3  16 
Government project  74  4.51  3.50  1  15 
 
Figure 36. Coefficients of numbers of bidders estimated by partially nonlinear IV regression  
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Wider distribution of public tender information at cheaper costs will increase competition 
as well as improve transparency and accountability  
 
Our findings indicate that attracting more interest at the initial stage of competition is 
important to enhance actual competition. To attract more interest and bidders, tender notices 
should be distributed widely. One measure is to advertize public tenders on national 
newspapers, rather than local ones. In our data, it is clear that more firms showed interest 
when tenders were advertized on national newspapers (Figure 38). If the media is changed 
from local to national newspapers, bidders are estimated to increase by about 20 percent, 
which would contribute to decreasing the procurement costs by 6-7 percent. 
22 
 
Figure 38. Average number of bidders by tender announcement domain  
 
 
E-bidding or e-procurement can contribute to distributing tender information even more 
widely and timely. The Nepal government has recently introduced the e-submission system 
in the road sector.
23 This is now being applied to other procuring agencies, such as the 
Department of Irrigation. The Government has decided to make e-procurement mandatory in 
public procurement estimated over NRs20 million in 2011 and intends to expand it to all 
procurement from the next year. These efforts are clearly consistent with our findings.  
 
                                                 
22 This is calculated based on the IV result.  
23 In our sample data, the road contracts were advertized through traditional mass media, such as newspapers, e-
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Based on our estimation results, three more bidders would enter the market if bidding 
documents were distributed free of charge, for instance, on the website.
24 The cost 
effectiveness of this measure is clear:
25 It could reduce the cost of road procurement works 
by 17 percent, because of the competition effect. The expected gains are estimated at NRs 
187 million or $2.5 million (Table 14). On the other hand, the government would have to 
lose the current revenue from bidding document sales, which amount to about NRs 7.7 
million or $0.1 million in total for 155 sample contracts. Thus, the expected gains from 
making bidding documents charge-free are far greater than the opportunity costs.  
 
Table 14. Scenario analysis of making bidding documents free of charge   
Revenue being lost:       
    Average price of bidding documents (NRs)  1,548 
      Number of bidding documents sold  3,672 
      Total revenue from sales of bidding documents (NRs million) 
 
7.77 
Potential gains from intensified competition 
        Elasticity of bidder participation with respect to bidding document costs  -0.51 
      Elasticity of bid prices with respect to bidder participation  -0.34 
      Expected reduction in bids by making bidding documents charge-free (%)  17.1 
      Total cost savings (NRs million)     186.5 
 
 
Longer bid preparation periods encourage bidder participation in public tenders  
 
We found that the longer bid preparation period would enable more firms to participate in 
public tendering. As stipulated in the procurement guidelines, it is important to grant 
sufficient time for firms to prepare bids. By doing so, even inexperienced contractors are 
allowed to participate in auctions, thereby intensifying competition in the market. Of 
particular note, the extension of the bid preparation period is a no-cost measure for procurers. 
Governments may have to make some efforts toward preparing public tenders ahead of time. 
But this can be accommodated by other administrative efficiency gains, for instance, by 
                                                 
24 This is estimated based on the zero-truncated negative binomial regression result.  
25 This illustration does exaggerate the expected impact of lowering the cost of bidding documents, because the 
estimated elasticities should be interpreted as a marginal effect. Distributing bidding documents free of charge 
is a large change, though it may not be economically large. However, the direction of the expected impact is 
clear: Lower bidding document prices will invite more bidders, reducing procurement costs.   
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introducing e-procurement, which can increase the efficiency in distributing the tender-
related information and collecting the bid-related information. As the result, procurers can 
extend the bid preparation period without compromising anything.  
 
In Nepal, some of the government owned projects have extremely short bid preparation 
periods. While an average of 31 days are allowed for the bid preparation in World Bank 
projects, 21 days are granted in the government owned projects (Table 15). As an indicative 
target, 30 days may have to be given for bid preparation. About 70 percent of World Bank 
contracts satisfy this target, but the majority of the government financed projects are below 
the threshold. By increasing the bid preparation period by 10 days in the government projects, 
1.5 bidders would additionally enter the market according to our estimation result.
26 This 
would then reduce the equilibrium bid by about 8 percent, which would materialize a cost 
savings of NRs14.9 million or $0.2 million in the sample government projects in total.  
 
Table 15. Average bid preparation period (days)   
   Obs  Mean Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
World Bank project  82  31.1  6.6  15  52 
Government project  73  21.6  9.0  6  33 
 
 
Local contractors’ capabilities need to be fostered to enhance competition  
 
Our estimation results show that firm location does not matter to bid prices but influences the 
bidder entry strategy. If a project site is far from firms’ locations, they are less likely to apply 
for the public tender. Hence, the local contractors’ capacity will emerge as an important 
challenge for the country. Clearly, more local enterprises exist in some districts than others. 
Particularly, the share of local firms in the pool of potential contractors is low in the districts 
of Kailali, Palpa and Rautahat (Figure 39).
27 In addition, local firms do not appear 
                                                 
26 Ditto.  
27 There is no significant difference even if the figure is calculated with the data of firms that actually 
participated in the competition, because there is no systematic difference in firms’ entry decisions between local 
and nonlocal firms. The probability of participation is slightly higher for local firms (0.31) than nonlocal 
enterprises (0.26).   
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competitive enough, despite their potential advantages of proximity to the project location. 
Local bids are slightly higher than nonlocal bids (Table 16). In the bid regression, the dummy 
variables representing bidders’ origin districts vary considerably. While companies from 
Siraha are systematically found competitive, firms from Rupandehi are found less 
competitive in the road procurement market. Firms originated from Kathmandu are found to 
be equally comparable with others. Thus, greater efforts may need to be made to develop the 
capacity of local businesses to undertake road projects in lagging districts.  
 
Public procurement can be used to foster the local business capacities. Particularly, public 
road works can contribute to local employment. In Latin America, large economies 
announced $25 billion of additional stimulus packages, mostly in the infrastructure sector, in 
2008-2009. This is expected to create 2 million jobs or 7 percent of the unemployed in the 
region (Schwartz, Andres, and Dragoiu, 2009). In the United States, the labor requirement for 
a road project of equal value is much higher in the Southeast and South Central states, 
compared with other states (Anderson and Jacoby, 2000).  
 
However, it is noteworthy that the existing literature is not necessarily in favor of preferential 
procurement. As per Marion (2007), road procurement costs under bid preferences are 3.8 
percent higher in California. Citizens can benefit from local employment but may have to 
bear the heavier tax burden. Particularly, preferential treatments tend to be vulnerable to 
political interference. The favoritism toward local service providers, rather than lowest price 
contractors, is estimated to increase public procurement costs by 38 percent in Sweden 
(Hyytinen et al., 2006). Therefore, the strategic allocation of projects can be useful to foster 
the capability of local industries, but competitive pressure and transparency should be 
maintained in the procurement process.   
 
Table 16. Average normalized bids by bidders’ locality   
   Obs  Mean  Std.Dev.  Min  Max 
All bids  810  0.80  0.21  0.10  1.64 
Local (project district) bids  313  0.82  0.20  0.29  1.14 
Nonlocal bids  497  0.79  0.21  0.10  1.64 
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Figure 39. Proportion of local firms purchasing bidding documents  
 
 
Security is great concern for not only procurement costs but also road management  
 
Security issues were found to push up bid prices and discourage the market entry of potential 
firms. Both will end up with a heavy burden on the economy. Improved security would bring 
about multiple benefits for the public road procurement. First, improved security would bring 
down bid price, thereby government’s procurement costs. As an indicative target, to reduce 
the procurement costs by 10 percent, security incidents need to be halved.
28 This cost savings 
can be interpreted as the increased confidence of contractors about project locations and 
general business environment. In addition, the improved security could induce more firms to 
participate in the competition, which would in turn contribute to reducing road procurement 
costs further.  
 
Second, security incidence results in cost overruns and project delays. As an indicative target, 
to halve the project delays (as opposed to an average delay of 107 days), security incidents 
need to be halved. This would also mitigate cost overruns by some 15 percent of the overrun 
ratio.  
 
Security issues would likely hamper road maintenance required, deteriorating the quality of 
roads. As an indicative target, for instance, to increase the average driving speed by 5 km per 
hour (some 20 percent of the average speed in our data), security incidents need to be more 
than halved. Our estimation results suggest that vehicles could drive 20 percent faster if the 
                                                 
28 This is based on the estimated coefficient of lnsecuritybefore in the IV bid estimation.  
.
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number of security incidents would decline by 70 percent. This can be interpreted as the 
effect of the improved maintenance conditions around road locations.  
 
Weather will cause project delays  
 
The government should be aware of the risk of project delays caused by weather conditions. 
It rains a lot in Nepal. Increased precipitation is likely to cause project delays, which often 
result in cost overruns and undermine fiscal efficiency. The project risk related to weather is 
region-specific and clouded with uncertainty, as shown in Figure 9. Therefore, the road 
procurement planning and budget formulation need to have certain flexibility to incorporate 
possible project delays, with possible exogenous factors taken into account.  
 
Our estimation results suggest that about 5 percent of project delays may need to be expected 
in the budget formulation and project preparation. This would allow to accommodate about 
10-15 percent of unusual precipitation causing road project works. Too tight procurement 
plans will undermine the credibility and efficiency of the budget execution. If a project is 
implemented where it rains heavily, the government needs to be cautious about the budget 
formulation.  
 
Proper and solid project design and preparation help to avoid unnecessary contract 
amendments and improve efficiency of the whole project cycle  
 
Our evidence suggests that proper project specifications are important to avoid unnecessary 
contract amendments and minimize the risk of contractors’ opportunistic behavior. Some 
work activities and inputs are found to be systematically prone to ex post contract 
amendments. Bitumen and earthworks are typical items that would cause cost overruns. 
Hence, it is important to design a project with proper technical specifications and make sure 
that all the information is reflected in the bidding documents.  
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Large projects should particularly be designed and prepared carefully. It is clear that large 
cost overruns and project delays tend to occur in World Bank projects, rather than 
government owned projects (Table 17). This is partly because World Bank projects are 
relatively large compared to Government projects. Larger projects are more likely to bring 
about large post-award contract adjustments, as discussed above.  
 
The quality assurance mechanisms in procurement systems are important. As discussed, 
quality bidding documents need to be prepared with past procurement performance and 
exogenous factors, such as weather and conflicts, taken into account. In addition, the ex post 
quality evaluation needs to be implemented to exclude technically unreliable bids and bidders. 
In our sample, 10 percent of contracts did not have a post-qualification review before 
contract award. By tightening all these preparation and procurement processes, the reliability 
and efficiency in rural road project implementation can be improved as a whole.  
 
Improved reliability and efficiency in project implementation will contribute to increase the 
budgetary performance in Nepal. In the country, the budget approval and release have been 
delayed in recent years. As the result, many road projects had to be launched at the end of the 
fiscal year. And delays would likely cause cost overruns, as discussed. The whole budgetary 
system turned out inefficient and unreliable.  
 
Table 17. Average cost overruns and project delays in World Bank and Government projects   
   Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Cost overruns (%)           
    World Bank project  81  6.7  6.7  -1.5  21.7 
    Government project  74  0.3  3.4  -14.8  14.0 
Project delays (days) 
              World Bank project  81  190  256  -76  1217 
    Government project  74  12  37  -58  181 
 
Roads are deteriorating with time, traffic and precipitation if not properly maintained 
 
Our estimation results indicate that the quality of roads would decrease with the duration of 
use of roads, traffic volume and cumulative precipitation. If a road is used for one more  
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month (some 5 percent of the average duration of road use in our sample), the probability of 
the road being rated to be ―very uncomfortable‖ would increase by about 8 percent. Thus, the 
vast majority of roads would be rated to be ―very uncomfortable‖ if they are used for more 
than one year. Security incidence would worsen the quality of roads, as discussed above. The 
poorly maintained road conditions will after all increase transport costs for the economy.  
 
Capacity building for efficient road procurement is necessary at local level  
 
Government effectiveness in contracting road contracts varies significantly across districts. 
Some can be attributed to technical reasons, such as technical complexity of projects. But 
there are significant unobserved (in)efficiency factors across districts (Figure 40). Some may 
be related to corruption. Others may be caused by more general reasons. Important, the 
lengthy contract award process is likely to result in significant project delays. Local 
government capacity needs to be developed further to speed up the bid evaluation process.  
 
Improved procurement efficiency in donor financed projects will also help the government to 
procure road works efficiently. To award a road work, about 100 days are required in World 
Bank projects (Table 18). In DDC projects, it takes less than a month to conclude a contract 
after the bid opening. There are systematic differences in project specifications and required 
processes between the donor-assisted and government-financed projects. However, efforts 
toward reduce procurement inefficiency are needed for the government to enhance the 
procurement capacity and maximize value for money in the public projects. A recent analysis 
in Brazil shows that the duration of procurement processes for large public projects can be 
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Figure 40. Unobserved district-specific inefficiency in contract awarding  
 
 
Table 18. Average time required to award a road contract after the bid opening (days)   
   Obs  Mean Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
World Bank project  81  99.9  32.9  27  190 
Government project  73  24.6  24.1  1  171 
 
 
VI. CONCLUSION  
 
 Transport infrastructure is important for economic growth. In particular in rural areas, the 
lack of access to reliable transport infrastructure remains a significant constraint for people’s 
daily life and local businesses. In Nepal, about 20 percent of rural residents have to spend 
more than 3 hours to go to the nearest marketplace or agriculture center. Over the world, 
about 900 million rural dwellers are estimated to have no access to all-weather road within 
two kilometers―typically equivalent to a walk of 20-25 minutes.  
 
Public procurement is an important instrument to use resources wisely and efficiently. How 
to design an efficient procurement system is still a challenge in the infrastructure sector, 
because infrastructure projects are often technically complex, highly customized and 
politically sensitive. Therefore, the markets tend to be vulnerable to collusive bidding and 
corruption. The bid evaluation process tend to take long time. Contracts tend to be far from 
complete; many infrastructure projects undergo massive cost overruns and project delays. In 
addition, road assets will deteriorate quickly if not well maintained.  
 
.
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As a result, a series of policy challenges, from procurement design to contract management 
and project quality assurance, are interrelated to each other and need to be addressed in 
concert. New data were collected from 155 rural road upgrading contracts in Nepal, on which 
about 820 bids were submitted. Various important findings were discussed. However, in 
order to achieve the cost efficiency in public road procurement, competition is found the 
single most important factor. In addition, competition will prevent alleged collusion and 
corruption as well as foster local businesses.  
 
To increase competition, it is essential to remove various entry barriers―both explicit and 
implicit ones. Public tender notices can be advertized more widely. Bidding documents can 
be distributed free of charge. E-procurement can be a good way to take these measures. It can 
also offer a one-stop service to publish all the information on business opportunities related 
to public works. In addition, e-procurement will be conducive to promoting accountability 
and transparency in public procurement systems. The capacity of local businesses also is also 
crucial to increase competition, because security issues are hampering the firms’ participation 
in the market. Moreover, firms are found less willing to undertake public works far from 
their locations. Hence, local businesses are essential.  
 
Enlarging contract packages may help to attract more potential bidders. But the government 
should be aware of the risk of increasing the bid evaluation costs. It takes longer to evaluate 
larger contracts. In addition, more firms are expected to apply. The efficiency in contract 
awarding seems to vary significantly across regions. To make the evaluation process short, 
capacity building may be necessary at the local level. This will also help to reduce the risk of 
collusion and corruption caused by the lengthy bid evaluation and contract award process.  
 
To mitigate cost overruns and project delays, security issues need to be addressed. Weather 
conditions are also one determinant. Particularly where it rains a lot, careful project and 
procurement planning is necessary. Otherwise, the efficiency of the budget execution will be 
undermined. Finally, roads deteriorate over time anyway. Traffic and precipitation will affect 
road conditions. However, security issues seem to be the most critical to implement timely  
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ANNEX I. ISSUES IN PUBLIC ROAD FINANCING  
 
Good transport infrastructure is essential not only for people’s life but also to increase the 
economy’s efficiency in production and transaction. Better access to roads can help firms to 
minimize inventory and distribution costs (Shirley and Winston, 2004). Good road 
infrastructure can also attract foreign direct investment and increase exports (Cieślik and 
Ryan, 2004; Boudier-Bensebaa, 2005; Qureshi, 2008; World Bank, 2009b). Exporting firms 
generally prefer to be located close to motorways and accessibility to interregional demand 
(Holl, 2004).  
 
However, available resources that can be used for infrastructure development are limited in 
many developing countries. Governments typically spend 1-3 percent of GDP for transport 
infrastructure. Low-income countries seem to invest on average 1.5 percent of GDP in the 
transport sector (Figure 41). In Bangladesh, about 0.7 percent of GDP of public resources are 
allocated to the transport sector. India is estimated to have been spending 1.4 percent of GDP 
for roads alone in recent years. Nepal spent $105 million or 1.2 percent of GDP for road 
development, of which 80 percent were supported by foreign aid (World Bank, 2005). These 
are often not sufficient compared to the remaining infrastructure deficits. The needs estimates 
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Figure 41. Transport infrastructure needs and spending in selected low-income countries  
  
Sources: Briceno-Garmendia, Smits and Foster, 2008; Robin and Krishnamani, 2009; Bhattacharyay, 2010; Africa 
Infrastructure Country Diagnostic Database; Bangladesh Annual Development Program 2007/08; India 10th 5-Year Plan 
2002-07.   
 
The road sector particularly faces difficulties in ensuring financial sustainability. First, roads 
are de facto subsidized by governments, and the public finance remains a dominant source of 
funding in the transport sector (Figure 42). Except for a few cases, such as toll roads and 
cities adopting cordon pricing, roads are almost free of charge. Even in the United States, 277 
toll roads, bridges and tunnels, totaling about 5,000 miles, account for only 0.2 percent of 
total road network, generating less than 10 percent of total highway funding required 
(NSTIFC 2009). Fuel levies and vehicle-related fees and taxes can partly finance public 
roads. But they are insufficient. Rather, fossil-fuel-related consumption is often heavily 
subsidized in developing countries. Energy subsidies in the developing world are estimated at 
$312 billion in 2009 (IEA, 2010).  
 
Figure 42. Public infrastructure investment in Sub-Saharan Africa 
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Second, related to the above, private financing in transport infrastructure has been limited. 
Private participation in infrastructure continues to play an important role even in developing 
countries. It has reached close to $160 billion per annum in 2009. However, private 
participation remains selective by sector and country. The transport sector accounts for about 
15 percent of total private investments in infrastructure for the past two decades. The vast 
majority were invested in the ICT and energy sectors (Figure 43).  
 
It is noteworthy that private financing cannot substitute for public financing. Governments’ 
strong commitment and other legal and institutional frameworks in the infrastructure sector 
are important to catalyze more private investments, as experienced in Latin America during 
the 1990s. While Chile and Colombia, in which public investment has remained high, 
attracted many private investments, private participation in infrastructure also tends to be 
marginalized, as in Argentina and Mexico where the public spending was also tightened 
under the fiscal pressure (Calderón and Servén, 2004; Fay and Morrison, 2007).   
 
Figure 43. Private participation in infrastructure in developing countries  
 
Source: PPI database.  
 
However, the current public procurement systems may not work well to improve efficiency 
in spending resources in the infrastructure sector. Public procurement is normally sizeable in 
the economy. The public sector often account for 20 to 25 percent of GDP in developing 
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Thus, well-designed public procurement systems could save a lot of public resources. 
Conversely, a small flaw in the procurement design could result in significant losses of the 
economy.  
 
It remains a challenge to design an efficient procurement system. Competition has been 
limited in infrastructure procurement auctions. In theory, competitive bidding is a powerful 
device that can induce potential contractors to reveal their true costs, thereby finding the 
lowest possible procurement price. However, the literature shows the average number of 
bidders is about 3 to 5 in infrastructure projects (Gupta, 2002; De Silva, Dunne, and 
Kosmopoulou, 2003; Alexeeva, Padam, and Queiroz, 2008). 
 
Another concern is that infrastructure procurement is susceptible to corruption and collusion. 
The literature particularly points many alleged collusive cases in the road sector all over the 
world (e.g., Porter and Zona, 1993; Gupta, 2002; Price, 2008). This is because the size of 
road procurement markets is often significant. In addition, the market competition is repeated 
periodically. Thus, firms are easily motivated to collude with each other. Collusive 
arrangements can be sustained (e.g., Saijo et al., 1996; Thomas, 2005; Ware et al., 2007). 
Particularly in developing countries, the validity or enforceability of rules of conduct and 
other laws remains weak and the capability of detecting misconduct is far from perfect. In 
addition, sanctions may not be significant even if misconduct is detected.  
 
In general, weak governance remains an important challenge to public procurement. This 
could possibly impose additional large costs on governments and thereby taxpayers. About 
35 percent of firms are estimated to offer informal payment to public officials to secure 
public contracts in Africa; about 62 percent in Nepal (World Bank, 2009). In Indonesia 
construction materials for roads were stolen or misused during the project implementation, 
resulting in additional costs of 20 to 30 percent of total procurement costs (Olken, 2007). 
Auriol (2006) estimates the cost of corruption to be between 4 and 10 percent of world 
procurement spending. In Uganda, about 1.5 percent of GDP per year is estimated to be lost 
because of widespread corruption, mostly in public procurement (Mellemfolkeligt Samvirke,  
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2005). In Africa as a whole, one-fourth of GDP may be lost to corruption every year 
(Thachuk, 2005). 
 
As a result, public roads are often underinvested and poorly maintained in developing 
countries. Road maintenance is particularly to be neglected. In Africa, about 30 percent of 
the infrastructure assets are estimated to need rehabilitation. In the road sector, only 37 
percent of the road network in African low-income countries is in good condition. For feeder 
or rural roads, the share is even lower. 17 percent of the tertiary roads are in good condition 
(Foster and Briceno-Garmendia, 2010). Therefore, there remain the significant needs for road 
investment and maintenance that have not been met.  
 
Important, road assets deteriorate exponentially without proper maintenance. According to a 
case study based on highway development software, HDM4, road roughness would increase 
over time and exceed a usual maintenance standard of IRI 4.5 in 5 to 6 years.
29 Generally, 
maintaining roads assets is more cost-effective than letting them deteriorated and 
reconstructing them. In Africa it is estimated that about $40 to $45 billion of road assets were 
lost because of inadequate maintenance, which would have cost only $12 billion, during the 
1970s and 1980s (Harral and Faiz, 1988). Moreover, climate change may increase the 
importance of road maintenance, because poorly maintained roads are even more vulnerable 
to severe weather conditions. Potholes, clacks and wide joints are the places where water 
infiltrates in the road, accelerating deterioration. In developing countries, many roads remain 
to be paved (Figure 44). This could add to the risk of road deterioration and thus the cost of 
rehabilitating damaged road surfaces.  
 
Therefore, the challenges for sustainable public road financing are complex and interrelated. 
Governance will affect not only the bidding behavior at competitive bidding but also post-
                                                 
29 In this particular case, a 10-km primary bituminous road with 2 lanes in a tropical area is examined using the 
software HDM4. The project life is assumed 35 years. The discount rate is set at 12 percent. Two maintenance 
options are compared: (i) do minimum (reconstruction when IRI reaches 10, with routine pothole patching and 
edge treatment), and (ii) GASO4.5 (structural overlay at IRI 4.5, with routine pothole patching and edge 
treatment).   
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award practices of contractors. Weather and other exogenous factors will also affect the 
bidding behavior, contractors’ performance and the quality of roads delivered. All these 
issues need to be considered when evaluating the performance of public road procurement.  
 
Figure 44. Share of paved roads by region  
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